US President elect, Joe Biden
After days of suspense with hustle and bustle, the dust seems to be settling on the U.S. arguably fiercest election in recent years. In spite of Trump’s grievances and dissatisfaction with the impending outcome, Joe Biden, the Democratic Party candidate is the anticipated president-elect. Indeed, many heads of state, including those from Africa, have delivered congratulatory messages, a sign of diplomacy, support and future cooperation with his forthcoming ascendency onto the highest seat of government in the world today.
In an era of deepened interdependence between the U.S. and other nations including that of Africa, Biden’s approach to foreign policy and implications for U.S.-Africa relations with development assistance sequels is very salient for discussion. Is the Biden administration going to expand its wings and reach out to Africa more than it has been the case in the past four years, or nothing is going to change much despite the description by critics and analysts alike that Trump’s policies are that of isolationism, protectionism and unilateralism?
Historically, the U.S. was a latecomer among the other western States in African affairs sub of the Sahara, starting on a moderate note with less urgency especially with regards to economic engagements. On a commendable note, however, according to a renowned Professor of Political Science and International Relations in the 1950s-60s; American commitments in relation to Africa are couched in the general terms of assurances of goodwill and support for legitimate aspirations…The scale of American aid to Africa has so far been trifling in comparison with our largesse elsewhere, but as the number of independent African states multiplies, the American aid program expands.’ True to the words, it did.
According to the latest OECD development aid report (2019), since the 1970s, American aid to Africa increased steadily to overtake France as the highest donor in official development assistance (ODA) term. The inflow had an exponential growth from the Bush-era and sustained during the Obama era expanding from $2 billion in 2002 to $8 billion in 2015. American aid for the 2015-2017 years was between $8.5 billion to $11.2 billion, over three times more than the second-highest donor, the UK over the same period.
On the flip side, in the course of Trump’s era, there had been proposed budget cuts of 20% to 30% for total world foreign aid spending which has actually reflected in the reported spending obligations by the USAID data. For instance, aid to Ethiopia reached a peak of $1.1 billion in 2016 and 2017 but fell to $878 million in 2018 and $928 million in 2019, could be much less after reporting year 2020. We see the same sharp fall for countries like Kenya and in the case of Ghana fell from 2016 peak of $711million to $183million in 2018 and $141million in 2019.
True to the words, Trump’s American first policy direction tends to be reflecting in all other aspects of relations and financial commitments with the rest of the world. It has culminated in actions such as dissatisfaction with NATO alliance, the withdrawals from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), the 2015 Paris Agreement on climate change mitigation and the Iran Nuclear Deal, and surprisingly started the process for the U.S. exit from the WHO. Theoretically from the perspective of International Relations, the American First policy by a revisionist leader of a status quo country could not have been in tandem with the structural principles of the international system, as assumed by neorealists like Kenneth Waltz.
In the nutshell, the repercussions have affected almost every facet of the complex world of interdependence, where Africa experienced immediate fall in foreign aid which could have become worse with Trump’s second term, as well as other overarching long-term effects on development and welfare such as could be emerging from climate change, economic stress and even the rise of China with geopolitical and soft power interests.
Joe Biden’s proposed policy direction would be reversing Trump’s approach both at home and abroad, which could be experienced in Africa also. Arguably, sub-Saharan Africa is the least priority region for America’s interests, so less is mentioned in discussions and literature about policy shift effects on the continent, but it is relevant to economic and political development of the continent.
The policy shift has started with slogans such as ‘America is back and America has your back’, ‘America must lead again’, ‘restore the soul of America’ and the likes, indicating Biden’s proposition of openness, multilateralism and alliance. Such would be implemented through the essentials of re-entering and strengthening treaties, pacts and alliances; strengthening liberal democracy both at home and abroad; and curbing the rise of China but cautiously not to fall into a ‘Thucydides trap’. These and other overlapping implementation strategies are likely to affect the development assistance that would be channelled to developing countries as in Africa.
First, Biden has attached urgency to reentering trade pacts and treaties such as the TTP, the Paris climate accord and the Iran Nuclear deal. He has also given the strongest indication of halting the WHO exit, while there are plans to fortify NATO’s collective security structure. Trump’s biggest problem with this cooperation and alliances has been the spending structures, withdrawals, therefore, meant reducing spending. Reimaging and reversing such policies, although might be considered by Biden critics as costly failures of the global order-building project, but in no less terms, an attestation of America is back with taking responsibility and at the same time affirming the country’s position as the status quo power.
As noted in an article by Apodaca, states deal with other states to maintain and protect the status quo, or change the status quo, in whichever case, foreign aid is employed as a policy tool in influencing the domestic and foreign affairs of other states. Biden intends to protect America’s influence which seems undermined by Trump, hence requires other countries for association agreements, trade deals and cooperation with common interests to counter any other revisionist power or state. It is a strong basis for arguing that aid would be increased to developing countries with corresponding higher percentages to Africa as used to be the case.
Second, Trump’s era is unequivocally marked by high incidents of political divisiveness, inequalities and violent protests – detrimental to inclusiveness and trust in democratic institutions. That seemed to have erupted from the weakened structure of America’s democracy. Likewise, the laxity with concern for democratic and governance issues in other regions is lucidly threatening the liberal democratic principles that the United States aspires to over the years with financial motivations for deterrence and compellence strategies.
Biden, on the other hand, is bent on actions that could reinvigorate democratic alliances with America as the leader of the hitherto established free world. Such a leader is committed to relaxing migration laws and protecting asylum seekers by reinstating a program that offers hope for ‘Dreamers’.
Within such a frame, foreign policy would likely be spiced with an increase in financial aid and assistance to motivate countries in upholding democratic values, strengthening related institutions and lobbying deteriorating States to come to the norm. Furthermore, Biden has reiterated a commitment to giving foreign aid to developing countries in order to address issues that could make people move out of such countries sometimes by illegal and dangerous means. Moreover, the new administration intends to host a Democracy Summit to reinvigorate the spirit of democracy with a framework that could sustain and forge a common agenda.
These are actions that in no small means would include African countries and as the region with the highest number of least developed countries, would be at the recipient end of development assistance. Historically, anytime U.S. policy shifts towards the promotion of democratic values and free-market reforms, it moves along with financial aid as it happened in the 1980s into the 1990s with the structural reforms in Africa. Biden avowed in the March/April Issue of Foreign Affairs magazine, ‘and we need to do more to integrate our friends in Latin America and Africa into the broader network of democracies and to seize opportunities for cooperation in those regions’.
Lastly, there is an ambitious intent to counter the rise of China, a rise that could be seen in all regions of which Africa is no exception, with economic programs like the Belt and Road Initiative, foreign aid, loans and technical cooperation. Biden sees China to be fast advancing in cutting edge innovations in clean energy, 5G, quantum computing, high-speed rail, artificial intelligence and the likes.
It is also his opinion that the United States should be trading with China but writing the rules that govern the trade and not just with knee-jerk reactions. On the one hand, China is subtly but strategically ‘playing the long game by extending its global reach, promoting its own political model, and investing in the technologies of the future’ but on the other hand, ‘Trump by cutting us off from the economic clout of our partners, has kneecapped our country’s capacity to take on the real economic threat.’ Says then aspiring candidate Biden.
The policy strategy against China is building a strong partnership with developed and developing countries around common democratic interests and values to confront China’s influence. Indeed, China’s engagement in Africa has been marked by a substantial increase in development assistance and financing over the past two decades, and for the U.S. to effectively court the African countries to curtail Chinese influence would mean going back to the peak of foreign aid as experienced just before the Obama-Biden exit and probably increase it further in the coming years. We could be seeing Biden doing exactly so, when we consider the traditional approach that he intends to adopt with the U.S.-China rivalry, unlike Trump’s populist strategy.
In Joe Biden’s victory speech he affirms; ‘it’s time to put away the harsh rhetoric’. He looks ready for action beyond the words characteristic of any political campaigns. His first priority undoubtedly would be ending the effects of the coronavirus on the American people, when that path becomes clearer, would move into gear onto the international stage and probably adopt ‘corona diplomacy’ along with other opening-up policies to woo friends, but also foes that may have been bred by Trump to prove that America is back and has their backs.
Such an action undeniably would move along with development assistance and urgency aid to Africa, the region with the largest bloc of nations on the United Nations, a political advantage for their relations with a Biden-Harris America. Mind you, the UN and its agencies, as well as other multilateral organizations, would fit well into Biden’s reaching out plan as conduits for propagating the neoliberal policies with development assistance packs – in such are provisions for Africa also.
