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AG’s Directive on Investigations: Rights on Paper, Rights in the Procedure – Nana Attobrah Quaicoe writes

Dr Dominic Ayine   Dr Dominic Ayine   Dr Dominic Akuritinga Ayine is the Attorney General and Minister of Justice

Sun, 22 Nov 2026 Source: Nana Attobrah Quaicoe

The Attorney-General’s new directive is the clearest statement yet of how Ghana’s investigators must treat suspects. Whether it changes anything depends on what happens next.

Ghana’s Attorney-General and Minister for Justice, Dr Dominic Ayine, has issued his Directive No. 001 of 2026 on constitutional and legal compliance in the conduct of criminal investigations. It goes to the head of every public body that can arrest, detain, search, seize, interview or intercept: the Police Service and CID, EOCO, the National Intelligence Bureau, the Narcotics Control Commission, Customs, Immigration, the Financial Intelligence Centre, and others.

What strikes me most is its opening admission. Ghana’s chief law officer says, in writing, that his office has observed recurring practices that fall short of constitutional standards: detention beyond forty-eight hours without production in court, arrests to recover civil debts, coerced or improperly recorded statements, searches without lawful authority, and the maltreatment of suspects before charge. Ghanaians have complained about these practices for decades. It is something else for the Republic’s own prosecutor to name them.

His admission is the right place to begin an assessment. The issue is not whether the Directive says the right things because I think it largely does. The question is whether it is built to change what happens.

What kind of instrument this is

I take note of how careful the Directive is about its own limits. The Constitution gives the Attorney-General responsibility for prosecutions under Article 88, not command of the investigating agencies. The Directive acknowledges this: it confers no new powers, yields to any statute it conflicts with, and does not touch the operational independence any agency enjoys in law. Most of its content restates law that already binds every officer: Article 14 on arrest and the forty-eight-hour rule, Article 15 on dignity, section 120 of the Evidence Act on voluntary confessions, and the Juvenile Justice Act. What is rather new is the operational layer around that law, and the means the Attorney-General has chosen to enforce it.

No one may be tried on indictment without the Attorney-General’s review of the docket. Evidence obtained in breach of the Constitution may be excluded, and the Office says it will not lend its authority to prosecutions built on torture or coercion and may decline or discontinue tainted cases. Investigators care about one thing above all: whether their case reaches court and survives. Tying compliance to that outcome is the most realistic form of pressure available to an Attorney-General who cannot discipline another agency’s officers.

Where it is strongest

The Directive’s best provisions close the loopholes officers actually use. The forty-eight hours now run from the moment liberty is first restrained, not from when the arrest is entered in the station diary. The “invitation to report” may not be used to hold someone who has not been lawfully arrested. Weekends, public holidays, transfers between stations and unfinished investigations are expressly ruled out as excuses. Repeated remand applications without demonstrable progress are barred!!

It goes into areas earlier guidance largely ignored. Asset freezes may not be used to pressure a suspect into a statement, a payment or a refund. Seized phones and computers must be forensically imaged and not browsed beyond the warrant. Suspects may not be forced to reveal passwords without a court order or statutory power. Suspects may not be paraded before the media, and investigators must disclose to the prosecutor material that helps the defence.

Records of procedures throughout the process must be created; thus, every detention facility must keep a register showing when each person was arrested, when their rights were read, who visited and when they were released or produced in court. Exhibit and warrant registers must be inspected weekly. Dockets in remand cases must reach the Attorney-General within thirty days. Each agency must report quarterly on detentions beyond forty-eight hours, every allegation of ill-treatment or coercion and its outcome, and the age of its dockets. Rights that are recorded can be audited; rights that are not recorded cannot.

Where it is weakest

I find the directive’s weakness less in what it says than in who checks it. First, the agencies report on themselves. The quarterly compliance reports go from each head of agency to the Attorney-General. There is no independent inspection, no requirement to publish, and no role for Parliament. The Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice and the Legal Aid Commission are copied in, but are given nothing to do beyond receiving cooperation when they inquire. An agency that detains people unlawfully is unlikely to report it accurately, and an unpublished report invites no scrutiny.

Second, discipline stays inside the agencies. Where a breach is established, it is the head of agency who must take disciplinary action and report back. Ironically, that is the same chain of command under which the breach occurred. The Directive does not say who establishes the breach, by what process, or what happens if a head of agency takes no action.

Third, the Directive asks investigators to seek the Attorney-General’s advice before any arrest in serious, complex or high-profile cases, including those involving public officers. As a quality check, that is sensible; many collapsed cases began with premature arrests. But the Attorney-General is also a Minister of State and a Member of Parliament. Placing a political office upstream of arrest decisions in exactly the cases most exposed to claims of selective targeting will reassure some and worry others. The Directive would be stronger if it said how that advice is recorded and whether it can later be examined.

Fourth weakness observed is the poverty of resources. Video-recorded interviews apply “where facilities exist.” Independent witnesses to statements must not be officers of the investigating agency. Female suspects must be searched by female officers, and seized devices imaged by trained personnel. Many district stations lack the equipment and staff for all of this. Without funding, “where practicable” will become the standard rather than the exception.

My observed Fifth weakness falls within the area of scope. The Directive applies to powers exercised for the purpose of investigating a criminal offence. Detentions, questioning and covert surveillance carried out on security grounds, with no immediate intent to prosecute, sit at its edges. Several of this year’s most criticised episodes began precisely there, as an invitation or a security matter that only later acquired the language of a criminal case.

Finally, the drafting needs a second pass. Several cross-references point to the wrong paragraphs, apparently left over from an earlier numbering, and the National Intelligence Bureau is misnamed. These are small things, but in a document about legal precision, defence counsel will notice.

The context it cannot escape

The Directive arrives after a year in which the conduct of several agencies drew sustained public criticism: arrests of political figures and commentators, detentions that began as invitations, homes searched, and questions about why some matters went to security agencies rather than the CID. Supporters of the government will read the Directive as self-correction. Critics will ask why it came only now, and whether it will be applied to cases the government cares about. Fortunately, both readings can be tested, because the Directive sets its own clock.

Four tests to watch

The first compliance reports. The first quarterly reports fall due at the end of the first full quarter after the Directive took effect. Will they be published, even in aggregate? Will they record any detentions beyond forty-eight hours? A report that finds no breaches will itself be telling.

A case dropped for a breach. The prosecution gate means something only if it is used. The real test is a case the government wants, discontinued because the evidence was unlawfully obtained.

Discipline reported. Agencies must incorporate the Directive into standing orders and training within ninety days, by early February 2027. More telling will be whether any officer is disciplined under it, and whether the public is told.

The twelve-month review. The Directive commits the Attorney-General to a review after a year. That review should be published and should bring in Parliament, CHRAJ and the Ghana Bar Association, not only the agencies themselves.

The Attorney-General has done something useful: he has put the state’s own failings on the record and set out, in one place, what lawful investigation requires. That is a necessary first step. But Ghana has never been short of rules on arrest and detention. It has been short of consequences. Whether this Directive becomes a turning point or another “sitrep” will be decided not by its text, but by time.

The author, Nana Attobrah Quaicoe, is an Intelligence and National Security Analyst, a former Director General of the Bureau of National Intelligence (2022-2025) and writes on national security and intelligence reforms, risk, integrity assessment and institutional governance in the Ghanaian context.

Columnist: Nana Attobrah Quaicoe