Ghana's Chieftaincy Debate (II)

Analysis: Ghana's Chieftaincy Debate (Part 2) by Mawuetornam Dugbazah

The Injustices of Chieftaincy as an Institution

I have often wondered why some debaters from the ante-chieftaincy camp readily perceive the flaws of chieftaincy's actors (not necessarily the institution itself) but choose to be lenient when similar flaws arise in association with conduct demonstrated among elected officials who are actors within the largely European-funded ?democratic? governance institutions. Let me ask: do these modern democratic institutions of governance not have roots in Europe's traditional belief that Africans are inferior? It is no wonder then that terms like ?ko?εto? (villager) largely originated from among educated Ghanaian urbanites as a term of ridicule for those who inhabit the nation?s rural areas. This may partially explain why some from the ante-chieftaincy camp are outraged by the ill-doing of chiefs but lenient when similar behaviour is exhibited by elected officials. "Tis a case of cultural (perhaps Europe-inspired) bigotry. I say this because of the double standards the ante-chieftaincy camp uses in this circumstance.

There are four perceived injustices of chieftaincy that are usually articulated in the analytically deficient writings of some from the ante-chieftaincy camp. They are: mismanagement of land resources; questionable or backward customs or traditions (i.e. trokosi and/or fiashidi); the absence of meritocracy in attaining to offices associated with chieftaincy institutions and following from this, the belief that chieftaincy retards modernism or 'development'. All of these perceived injustices of chieftaincy, except the absence of meritocracy argument are based on evidence that can be unearthed from primary and secondary sources. Unfortunately though, the ante-chieftaincy camp has left much to be desired in unearthing this evidence. This only provides more opportunity for the pro-chieftaincy camp to argue its case to uphold the institution.

Land Mismanagement

If one really pays attention to the issue of land management in Africa?by reading newspaper articles and archived records of tribunals and modern court cases?and if you have a sense of Africa?s history during European occupation of the continent, then you will note that competing land interests stem from the matter of who gets land and what gets produced. When we speak of the Akan monarchical model of chieftaincy, history informs us that because of its feudal nature, chiefs at one point became cocoa barons who profited on the backs of their people.

Akan chiefs determined what was produced during the cocoa boom periods of the past. Of course, the Europeans (notably the British) with whom some Akan chiefs made alliances were part of the motivating influence driving the production of cash crops like cocoa. In this scenario we have the principal (European economic interests) and the agent (Akan chiefs deriving power from labour control) theory that is sometimes noted in modern academia. Among the Akan, because a chief?s power is defined in terms of labour control, it was not uncommon to see the abuse of indigenes for a chief?s selfish interests. In fact, some will argue that the Danqua-Busia tradition of modern Ghanaian political thought imbibed this feudal mentality from the Asante and Akyem heritage of its main actors. Whatever the case, it must be categorically stated that in this case the problem in our discussion is not chieftaincy as an institution, but the conduct of chieftaincy?s actors. This scenario is analogous to the ideals constitutionalism and the rule of law versus the actual conduct of elected officials in a modern republic.

Among those whose heritage is the priestly tradition of chieftaincy, there is evidence to suggest that the influx of Akan traditions of chieftaincy via European political pressures and economic interests became the motivating factor for similar land mismanagement practices in European occupied Togoland (the old name for what forms part of what is modern Eυenyigba). To illustrate, the histories of localities within what today?s Eυes refer to as ?Eυedomε? (middle of Eυeland) such as Ho-Bankoe and Ho-Dome testify to the fact that the creation of entities like the Asogli State, through Europe-inspired amalgamation ?corrupted? Eυe chieftaincy. Both the Germans (pre-European War I of 1914; also called ?World War I?) and the British (post-European War I) had a hand in corrupting Eυe chieftaincy institutions. Through amalgamation which sought to amalgamate Eυe duwo??du? is an indigenous term for populated localities with significant economic activity? into Akan-like paramountcies, certain land mismanagement practices evolved in Eυenyigba. This is because ?amalgamation? whereby by Eυe leaders were pressured into adopting Akan monarchical models of chieftaincy created an environment that facilitated greed and the disbanding of collective decision-making associated with well established traditions of elders? councils and other decision-making hierarchies. Some Eυe elders will even trace aspects of practices like trokosi to this period, explaining that this was a time when many of the priests and chiefs or leaders were corrupted.

Eυeland?s priestly tradition of chieftaincy originally did not afford the same profit-making incentives of Akan monarchical chieftaincy models. This is because Eυenyigba?s Togbes were intended to hold land in trust for future generations. Land commodification was forbidden as it is today.

In the event that Eυe elders refused European advice with regards to amalgamation, European administrators (especially the British) sometimes resorted to selecting and supporting pliable political actors who were fluent in their languages and but no relation to priestly lineages. To further their cause, authentic chiefs of priestly lineages were subjected to authority diminishing activities. In other parts of Africa, Europeans married or slept their way into head lineages in order to bring their influence. The former practice which is often called ?indirect rule? led to the coinage of terms like ?warrant chief? since these false chiefs who did not qualify to be chiefs under the meritocracy of yesterday?s Eυe chieftaincy system, only existed in order to ?warrant? or guarantee the interests of selfish governments like that of 19th and 20th century Britain.

Indirect rule in 1920s Igboland provides a well noted example of how British imposition of warrant chiefs met with the famed Aba riots of 1929. The problem? The warrant chiefs were provided with authority outside the context of their birth communities. In other words, they did not ?merit? the authority Britain tried to use them to exercise among their own people. More recently, the same situation played out in the Aŋlo-Eυe parts of Ghana with the Ghana government as the principal (or European government replacement). Some may now understand why Aŋlo citizens were so vehemently opposed to unqualified impostors occupying chiefly positions in its traditional governance structure. As an academically-inclined people, it is obvious that Aŋlo has learned very important lessons from history. It has therefore refused to allow what happened in Eυedomε to happen in modern Aŋlo.

When we speak of duplicity of land sales associated with chieftaincy, let me say that there is an untold side of this oft recounted Ghanaian story. Many Ghanaians refuse to discuss the bribery that goes on by those making land purchases in rural areas where chiefs are the principal leaders. I investigated this matter directly in one of Volta Region's localities. I have chosen to withhold the name of the locality because the aftermath of the occurrence is not complete. As you can see, it is definitely one movie I am committed to watching!! In due season God willing, I will post the details of this land acquisition fiasco.

The point I want to raise in relation to the story is that the locality in question has a series of very simple but well laid out procedures for land acquisition. Apparently, the entire process is common knowledge to many of the indigenes of the area. In this particular case, there is a land granting elder who works in concert with several other elders and even reserves the right to reject land acquisition requests in the interest of its posterity and the norms of the community. Land acquisition requests can also be rejected on the basis of non-compliance with community obligations, an occurrence which sometimes happens with young people deemed by elders as ?amεyewo me?o ta o (people with no direction). More recently an occasion arose where a ?foreigner? acquired land from a member of the locality who is not a part of the land-granting group. The foreigner?s means for land acquisition was circumvention of the traditional land granting person(s): the man bribed another member of the community to acquire land for him. In the end, the traditional land-granting elder also granted the parcel of land to another individual with consent of the other elders. As you can see, this situation can create considerable difficulty. And it has.

Whose is to blame in this land acquisition fiasco? Is it the chiefs and land-granting elders? Or corrupt individuals who do not respect their own commonly accepted land acquisition customs? It seems that some people need to learn to respect and interpret customary land acquisition regulations (published and formal or not) as though they were indigenous ?bye-laws?. Again they may not be published or even formally enshrined, but they are what they are: the norm. This particular story opened my eyes to the fact that many times, when Ghanaians cackle over the so-called duplicity of chiefs in land sales, they conveniently leave out the other details: land purchasers trying to bribe their way into land acquisition via circumvention of their own customs. They also fail to point out that these occurrences have sometimes led their elders to answer their land requests with a big NO. This is hypocrisy and indicates that some of these stories that Ghanaians peddle need to be investigated further. In these discussions we should at least hear the chiefs and elders' side of the many land mismanagement stories. Perhaps there is something that those in the mainstream aren't being told.

The truth about some of these land acquisition tales that some corrupt Ghanaians among the educated elites usually tell in order to justify the disbanding of chieftaincy needs to be told. Perhaps when we get to the heart of the matter, we may learn that in some cases, it was a non-royal, a corrupt elder or even a corrupt purchaser who facilitated land acquisition thereby leaving certain royals to be absolved from guilt. Now that the Ghana Land Administration Project (LAP) has been put in place, this young writer predicts that foreign interests will only escalate the problem of land disputes because of Ghana?s current crop of higher educated (in the western sense) but treacherously corrupt elected officials. Yes, I believe that these elected officials will demonstrate themselves worse than the chiefs who are often being condemned without an opportunity to provide their side of the story.

If you do not believe my thesis, that foreign influence on elected officials via financial support of Ghana?s LAP will escalate land dispute issues just consider the history of the Buem state (Jasikan District of Volta Region) in modern Ghana. If Ghanaians refuse to learn from their history, as a diverse group of nations within a modern republic, they will repeat it. Buem?s example supports the thesis that European influences on Africa's leadership institutions lead to corruption. Of course, this is even when things are made to look good on the surface and are projected to be as such in the European and North American media.

Buem, it should be recalled was an experiment in ?amalgamation? where Akan monarchical chieftaincy models were intermingled with the priestly chieftaincy model of Eυes with the intention of making Eυe chiefs cater to European economic agendas. The experiment was intended to see how easy it would be to effect changes in Eυe chieftaincy elsewhere in Togoland in order to motivate its actors to chase cocoa profits, personal aggrandizement and British interests at the expense of indigenes of the Eυe-speaking populations of the early 1900s period. The experiment failed with the case of Buem ending in ethnic fighting due to problems with stool authenticity. Among the Ho-Eυes, resistance to amalgamation later gave way because of the availability of willing actors to participate in Britain?s corruption of Eυe chieftaincy. Now, if European interests were successful in achieving amalgamation in Eυedomε in the 1930s, despite considerable initial resistance on the part of Eυe indigenes, they will likely be more than successful using elected officials of the modern epoch whose allegiance to domestic interests has historically been next to non-existent. Check out what I have to say on the issue of questionable or backward practices associated with chieftaincy in Part 3 of this series.

Mawuetornam Dugbazah is the Editor of Our Insight, a quarterly published in Western Canada. His articles usually deal with African affairs, Health and Science issues and Business. To subscribe please write Our Insight c/o D-COMM at Suite 1428, 5328 Calgary Trail NW, Edmonton AB Canada T6H 4J8.