Navigating nation building & attendant governance realities: Lessons from Colombia’s bicentennial realities for Ghana

Introduction: Bi-Centenarian Credentials in Perspective

This think piece explores salient political, social, economic and security realities of the Republic of Colombia considered relevant to the Republic of Ghana, although the two countries and their respective cultural diversities are oceans apart.

Colombia is the only American nation named after Christopher Columbus, the “Admiral” whose transatlantic voyages (1492–93, 1493–96, 1498–1500, and 1502–04) opened the way for European exploration and colonisation of the “New World.” On the other hand, Ghana is also the only nation taking its name from the ancient Ghana Empire that flourished from about 6th–13th century. It did so across the Atlantic in West Africa and the western Sudan savannah region of modern-day southern Mauritania and Mali.

The Republic of Colombia attained independent nationhood two hundred years ago on 20 July 1810. That is no mean achievement. From a purely Ghanaian perspective, at that time, the indigenous states that preceded the formation of the Gold Coast Colony, Ashanti and the Northern Territories, were at war among themselves and with the European colonialists. The trans-Atlantic slave trade was still thriving despite its abolishment by the British in 1807.

On the one hand, 200 years of independence places Colombia among many older civilisations and states. On the other hand, it dwarfs Ghana, which boasts of some 63 years of independent existence. But like Colombia, Ghana would hopefully thrive just as Colombia has been able to surmount its diverse challenges.

From a little background reading on Colombia’s story, it is incredible that Ghana and Colombia have a great deal in common, whether by way of challenges or positive developments. On either side of the debate, both countries have something to learn from one another. Therefore, it is imperative to draw a few parallels, especially in the areas of socio-political and security imperatives.

For instance, Colombia was the first constitutional government in South America. At the same time, Ghana was also the first country south of the Sahara to gain independence. But admittedly, Colombia’s achievement of statehood predates that of Ghana, evolving its Liberal and Conservative parties in 1848 and 1849, respectively. As is known, Ghana only followed suit about 100 years later in 1947, with the United Gold Coast Convention’s (UGCC) formation as a political movement. The Convention Peoples Party (CPP) followed as an offshoot of that movement in 1948.

Another shared characteristic of the two countries is ethnic and linguistic diversities, of Colombia’s over 50 million inhabitants and Ghana’s 30 million or so inhabitants. There is, however, one difference in this paradigm. Whereas Ghana is composed of mostly indigenous nations, Colombia is constituted of various societies, including Amerindian nations, European settlers, forced African populations, and European and Middle Eastern immigrants.

How then has Colombia been able to manage its cultural diversity as a strength and not a weakness? Could its experiences offer some lessons and examples to Ghana with episodic inter-ethnic tensions?

These attributes make the two countries proud trail-blazers of the norms and ideals of self-determination and democratic governance. In diverse ways, they have all been instrumental in consolidating peace, security and stability in their respective spheres and globally.

Multilateralism as a Hallmark of Regional Hegemony

Another significant area where Colombia and Ghana share a common characteristic is the domain of multilateralism. Colombia is considered a regional actor in international affairs. It is proudly the only Global Partner of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in Latin America. It is also a member of several major global and regional institutions, including the United Nations (UN), Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Organisation of American States (OAS), the Pacific Alliance and the Association of Caribbean States, among others.

Ghana obviously may not match Colombia in this regard. However, it has also been committed, since independence, to the ideals of multilateral institutions like the UN, Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), Africa-Caribbean-Pacific (ACP), African Union and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) compacts.

In this regard, too, it has to be recalled that several eminent Ghanaians played active roles in the Pan-African movement long before the country’s independence in 1957. This was more manifest in the lead role that Ghana’s first leader, Kwame Nkrumah, played. Nkrumah framed the country’s commitment towards African emancipation from the pockets of colonialism in the famous quote: “the independence of Ghana is meaningless unless it is linked with the total liberation of the African continent.” In consequence of this reality, Nkrumah’s name and that of Ghana have become synonymous with Pan-Africanism.

In another respect, Colombia also played a direct military role as an ally of the United States in the Korean War (1950-53). It was the only Latin American country that joined the war. Here too, Ghana could be said to have followed Colombia’s example, even if unknowingly.

After about three years of its independence, Ghana played a significant role in the then Congo Leopoldville in 1960, initially as an ally of Patrice Lumumba, the Prime Minister. Subsequently, though, Ghana committed itself to the UN’s search for peace from 1960-64. In that operation, the entire Ghana Army was rotated to the UN Operation in the Congo (ONUC). The Ghana Police Service also shares the honour of participating in police’s first deployment in pre-Cold War complex multidimensional peace operations. This was at the time when Dag Hammarskjöld, Ralph Bunche and Lester Pearson, among others, were experimenting with the technique of UN peacekeeping.

Indeed, especially since the end of the Cold War, Ghana has similarly actively participated in UN peace operations within the continent of Africa and all the other geopolitical regions of the world, except the Americas. It has also provided leadership to several UN peace missions, including in Somalia, Angola, Israel-Lebanon, Rwanda and Sudan.

Within the ECOWAS region, Ghana’s contribution during the 1990s was crucial to the diplomatic and military efforts in finding lasting peace and stability in the conflicts in the Mano River Union area, notably Liberia and Sierra Leone. The country has maintained its belief and commitment towards regional integration and cooperation in conflict-resolution efforts in other countries like Côte d’Ivoire and The Gambia.

Security as a Determinant of State Survival: Utility of Pragmatism and Consensus Building Post-Independence Wars and Political Violence

There is no doubt that Colombia has encountered monumental material and non-material, and external and internal security challenges that could have destroyed its cohesion. The country endured an inter-state war with Peru (Leticia War) in 1934 after its independence struggle against Spain. The country also withstood inter-party tensions during the “La Violencia” (The Violence) up to 1948. Since the 1960s, Colombia has also weathered the climate of devastating asymmetric low-intensity armed conflict and political violence, with the admixture of drug wars, which further escalated in the 1990s. However, in these contexts, Ghana’s road to independence was a walk in the park. It was spared the trauma of violent external aggression and internal armed conflicts, except for a few inter-ethnic conflicts. But Ghana, as explained later, needs to be careful about the emerging sub-culture of political violence.

Undemocratic Changes of Government: Symptoms of Democratic Ills

In the domain of extra-military seizures of power, a euphemism for a military coup, Colombia and Ghana have some commonalities. In 1957, when Ghana gained independence, Colombia came under military rule after what appeared to be an army grievance coup. The Colombian military negotiated with the guerrillas and continued in government for just about one year, up to 1958.

In contrast, Ghana has experienced four military takeovers, the first after only nine years of independence in 1966 and the second in 1972. Besides these two military coups, Ghana has also experienced one military uprising in May 1979 and a mutiny in June 1979, before the revolution in December 1981. It took Ghana over ten years before it was able to restore constitutional rule in 1992. This implies that the involvement of Ghana’s military in politics looms large on its political landscape.

Therefore, one may ask and rightly, why and how was Colombia able to endure only one coup against Ghana’s four or five upheavals? Are there any lessons from its governance, and political and economic institutions and practices that Ghana could learn from? One could think so. One could believe so. The discussion that follows makes a broad attempt to answer these questions and provide glancing pointers about the answers’ sources through the instrumentality of crafting the National Front governance architecture.

In a sense, the socio-political dynamics of the 1930s-1940s, including the Liberal hegemony, the unfavourable wartime conditions, the internal Liberal party division, and the crude Conservative reprisals against Liberals, laid the conditions for the National Front governance. Ghana could learn a lesson or two from Colombia’s internal politics around the National Front.

The National Front government was essentially a bipartisan consensus between the Colombian Conservative Party and Colombian Liberal Party. It was also a coalition of Conservatives and Liberals, by Alberto Lleras Camargo (Liberals) and Laureano Gómez (Conservatives), in the Declaration of Sitges (1957). The main objective, it appears, was to address the underlying socio-political conditions of the country, including the danger that Colombia’s two major political parties posed to the nation. These imperatives compelled the political parties to establish such a joint, rotating government with alternating presidents between the Conservative and Liberal parties every four years for 12/16 years. The collaborative framework also involved other elective offices through the equal division of seats in the cabinet, national legislature, provincial assemblies and municipal councils. This pragmatic arrangement, unusual as it was, was legitimised through a referendum. It helped stop the “La Violencia” and paved the way for far-reaching social and economic reforms.

Ghana’s UNIGOV Experiment

It is perhaps instructive to recall that Ghana sought to experiment with a form of the National Front government’s concept to attempt a Union Government (UNIGOV) in the 1970s. Suppose the National Front framework is understood well enough. In that case, it could be argued that in some ways, its objectives were similar to Ghana’s idea of the UNIGOV. As a cursory reminder, Ghana’s fourth leader, General Kutu Acheampong, proposed the UNIGOV idea in 1977 as a quasi-exit strategy for its increasingly embattled military regime, the Supreme Military Council (SMC II).

However, whereas the National Front was a collaboration between political parties, the UNIGOV idea arguably involved creating a one-party state or a no-party state. It was a form of non-partisan governance without traditional political parties’ participation, embracing the notion of “oneness” of the military, police, and civilians. In the General’s words, it was a national unity government of the people, for the people and by the people, but not a party government. In many ways, the UNIGOV idea’s foundering was the proximate cause of much of the military mutiny and revolution that engulfed Ghana for about two decades.

It is suggested that Ghana could apply some of the lessons from Colombia’s National Front government in helping to resolve critical issues that have the potential to erode the integrity of its democracy: political vigilantism; the new realities arising from the 2020 elections, such as the potential gridlock of the 8th Parliament; the SALL question which constitutes a violation of the Constitution and the human rights of the people of that area; and the potential threat of insurgency, even if the recent escalation in 2020 raises some unanswered questions.

Political Violence and Political Vigilantism: Ghana’s Emerging Sub-Culture

As is known, there is increasing concern about the growing hostility between Ghana’s two major political parties. The country’s democratic electoral processes, especially by-elections, have become “electoral battle spaces.” The emergence of party militia reflects this climate of vitriolic hate. Indeed, the violence that affected the voter registration, and the presidential and parliamentary elections in 2020 means that all of Ghana’s electoral activities, without exception, are prone to violence. In that regard, Colombia’s political conflict that resulted in the tragic death of at least 180,000 Colombians should serve as a lesson.

Parliamentary Political Contestation

The outcome of the 2020 parliamentary elections is even more poignant for fierce political contestation. For the first time since 2005, there is the prospect of the two major parties nominating and squabbling over different candidates for the House’s speakership. In 2005, the 230-seat Chamber of the Seventh Parliament was composed of NPP–128, NDC–94, PNC–4, CPP–3 and one Independent Member. The Speaker and Deputy Speaker’s election at the time threw up some tit-for-tat voting between the two major parties. According to his tweet of 28 December 2020, Okudzeto Ablakwa, MP, wrote that the NPP punished the NDC for backing a former NPP National Chairman, Peter Ala Adjetey, for Speaker (with 96 votes) against Ebenezer Sakyi Hughes (with 134 votes). In the voting for the Deputy Speaker, the NPP’s Alhaji Malik Alhassan won (with 135 votes) against the NDC’s Ken Dzirasah (with 94 votes).

Suppose that history repeated itself this time around. In that case, there could be an even more viciously intriguing election of the Speakers in the 275-seat Assembly of 2021. Each major party holds 137 seats with one Independent Member, according to the declaration of the EC. Political pundits posit that the work of Parliament will face a lot of gridlocks and fear this would make the country “ungovernable” unless the two parties reached broad mutual consensus. Because of the deepening political antagonism, there is even less talk that this balance of political power could make governance genuinely democratic and accountable. For instance, until there is a change, the existing paradigm could compel the political parties to invest in building inter-party trust. As Muntaka Mubarak, MP, has opined, both sides could agree on a couple of trust-building mechanisms. They could, for instance, jointly select an apolitical person as Speaker. They could also nominate a member from the opposing party that the respective party is comfortable working with Speaker.

The Santrofi, Akpafu, Likpe and Lolobi Debacle

Such consensus building between the two major political parties should extend to three or so questions around the process and outcome of the 2020 elections, namely the issues of SALL, Hohoe, and Techiman South.

The SALL question is about how the constituents have been disenfranchised. Professor Kwaku Asare, a foremost Accounting Professor, explains in straightforward terms that the SALL issue started with the government’s process to carve Oti Region out of the Volta Region in 2019. Although the SALL people protested against being expunged from their parent Hohoe District, and the Volta Region, the government did not grant them that wish. To the contrary, it decided to include the new area in the Oti Region. This apparent partisan approach was compounded by the EC which triggered a constitutional crisis on 6 December 2020 when it issued an “unconstitutional” directive to bar SALL constituents from voting in the parliamentary elections.

Therefore, these realities informed legal luminaire, Tsatsu Tsikata, to file a suit on behalf of a group of residents in the Ho High Court on 23 December 2020. The lawsuit sought the Court’s injunction to stop the EC from gazetting John Peter Amewu as the MP-elect for the Hohoe Constituency. They argued that this breached their rights to vote for a parliamentary candidate because of the creation of the Oti Region, coupled with a recent Supreme Court decision and the EC’s failure to create a constituency for them. A context of this case is that the affected “people from this enclave earlier on July 31 wrote to the EC in the quest to follow up on the EC’s position. Their letter was not responded to until the eve of elections when the EC told them that they [could] only vote in the presidential elections. Now, the life of this Parliament comes to an end on the 6th of January. So these people are not going to be represented in the next Parliament. They did not vote for an MP, and will not be represented.”

While the Court granted a 10-day injunction against the EC on 23 December 2020, the Attorney General (AG) dragged the Ho High Court to the Supreme Court for granting that injunction in the first instance. It argued that the plaintiffs/applicants were wrong in placing the case under article 99, and that “the High Court has no jurisdiction under article 33 of the Constitution to entertain a matter in the nature of a parliamentary election petition and to grant any reliefs(s) interim, interlocutory or final, available in a parliamentary election commended under article 99 and section 16 of the Representation of the People’s Law, 1992 (PNDC 284).” On 5 January 2021, a busy day in the Courts, the Supreme Court ruled by a unanimous decision to dismiss the injunction on Hohoe MP-elect’s swearing-in by a Ho High Court.

Even before this ruling, Martin Kpebu, a brilliant legal practitioner, had characterised this situation as “legal gymnastics” involving a 50-50 case that could go either way. However, he posits that all stakeholders should focus instead on getting the EC to put out a roadmap for laying a CI in Parliament, create the new constituency and allow the affected people to vote before the inauguration of the 8th Parliament on 6 January 2021. That he said, would make any court action unnecessary. That would be consistent with Professor Asare’s insistence that “allowing the EC to decide who can vote in general elections, thereby allowing the EC to determine the Speaker of the chamber, is a precedent that effectively creates a new Republic.” This position formed the basis of his call on the Justice Minister, charged with defending the Constitution, to lead the fight. In reality, none of these approaches happened.

The truth of the matter is that the SALL vote could alter the existing balance of power in the House in all the possible scenarios. If they vote as part of the Hohoe Constituency against the MP-elect, Amewu will lose the seat, and the NPP would end up with 136 votes. The status quo will not change if they vote as part of the Hohoe Constituency favouring the MP-elect, who would continue to keep the seat and leave the NPP with 137 votes. In the second scenario, if SALL votes as part of a new Constituency for an NPP candidate, the NPP would garner a majority of 138 seats in a 176-seat Chamber with one Independent Member. However, if SALL votes as part of a new Constituency for an NDC candidate, the NDC would become the majority party with 138 seats. SALL is a potentially critical area like Tain in 2008. It decided the overall outcome by a thin margin between the NDC’s Professor John Evans Atta Mills and the ruling party’s Nana Akufo-Addo.

The Disputed Techiman South Electoral Outcome

Besides the bloody violence in Techiman South, the electoral process’s legitimate outcome in that constituency centres on whether the results were collated following the election law or not. Samson Lardy Ayenini, one of Ghana’s leading lawyers, pointed out that there was no confirmation, ad interim, that the EC collated parliamentary results for the Techiman South Constituency on Form One C as required by Regulation 43 of CI 127.

According to the EC, the NPP’s candidate, Martin Adjei Mensah-Korsah, won 49,682 votes (50.2 per cent). In contrast, the NDC’s candidate, Christopher Beyere Baasongti, had 49,205 votes (49.8 per cent) of the total valid votes cast. Materially, the opposition NDC is contesting the EC’s declaration, claiming there was no collation after the election. The Wenchi High Court struck out the interim injunction application seeking to restrain MP-elect, Martin Adjei Mensah Korsah, from being sworn in on 6 January 2021, and awarded a cost of GH ?15,000 against the Petitioner. However, the legal battle was set to continue.

The hope is that Ghana could borrow some lessons from Colombia in managing the persistent tensions between the NDC and NPP. Without copying Colombia’s National Front brand in entirety, it could and should find a model that promotes peaceful political party coexistence. That would reflect a bold attempt to “resist the temptation to inject partisanship into election rules, requirements, or practices that burden the right to vote,” as argued by Professor Asare.

But hope alone is not an antidote. Ghana should pay heed to the caution that political violence in any shape or form could have catastrophic consequences even if it survives the fallouts.

Tamed and Untamed Insurgencies

In Colombia’s case, the persistent social and political problems were contributory factors to the emergence of destabilising guerrilla groups, the most notorious being the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), National Liberation Army (ELN) and the 19th of April Movement (M-19) since the ’60s and the right-wing, drug-trafficking United Self-Defences of Colombia (AUC) from the ’90s to the mid-2000s.

Colombia’s experiences with these non-state militant groups also serve as a note of caution to Ghana’s seemingly blind glimpse of the existential threat that political vigilantism poses to the state’s sovereignty and cohesion. If allowed to take roots in the country’s political institutions, political vigilantism would seriously undermine Ghana’s national sovereignty.

Colombia also presents other instructive lessons on the threat of insurgency. After decades of seeking a military solution to the threat posed by guerrilla groups, dialogue held much promise in providing a more durable solution to that challenge. This is one reason why Ghana should seek a sustainable solution to the “Western Togoland” question currently escalating in its fourth phase. This approach should include dialogue with the insurgents and involvement of traditional and other leaders in conflict resolution. Ghana should not steep itself in the erroneous belief that the military option alone would work. A hybrid approach holds much promise of a successful resolution of the conflict. Such an outcome would help save succeeding generations from the scourge of a conflict that cannot be wished away, as was the case for Colombia.

Towards More Constitutional Reforms, Institutionalisation and Bilateralism

Yes, Colombia has been confronted by enormous challenges over its 200 years of republican existence. But Colombia has also succeeded in managing these tests. How did it do that? The considered view is that it did that through a combination of policy approaches within its 1991 Constitution framework.

Including those aspects outlined already, Colombia centred its approaches on a combination of political institutionalisation and prudent economic management, coupled with the deconstruction of criminal economies. At the same time, it also chose poverty alleviation mechanisms through enhanced social and economic interventions and the opening of spaces for political dialogue and negotiation. This culminated in the far-reaching peace with the FARC guerrillas in 2016, as further efforts are made to address lingering issues like human rights abuses. In these ways, Colombia has attained the enviable accolade of being the third-largest diversified and macroeconomically stable economy in South America. It is categorised as one of the CIVETS—Colombia, Indonesia, Vietnam, Egypt, Turkey and South Africa—a group of leading emerging markets.

Given the commonalities between the two countries, it is logical to suggest strengthening the existing Colombia-Ghana collaboration across several domains. The most apparent areas include bilateral relations, trade and commerce, education and cultural, including visual arts, music and cuisine. They also include health, where it has achieved a respectable life expectancy of about 76.9 years, vis-à-vis Ghana’s of about 63.5 years (2017). It should even include sports collaboration, especially football.

Indeed, we must also add the domain of military collaboration. Here, Ghana could learn from Colombia’s national security strategies and policies that have contributed to the prevailing climate of peace and stability. Ghana should consider reforming the management of its natural resources to benefit the broader population. That would help remove the potential risk of resource mismanagement becoming a motivation for youth extremism and violence. It would also help to sever the affinities between that sector and terrorist and other criminal networks.

To these ends, it is advocated that Ghana muster the political courage and commitment to implement the relevant reforms in the Constitutional Review Commission (CRC) report of 2011. Colombia shows us that constitutional provisions must not become fossilised but must move abreast with the times.