The Ivoirians’ Claim: A Classic Case Of Intelligence Failure.

BY Guure Brown Guure

INTELLIGENCE ANALYST AND BROADCASTER

Smart.brown@googlemail.com

In a press briefing on the increasingly unstable situation in Afghanistan after the American led invasion in 2002 former American Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld stated, “There are known knowns. These are things we know that we know. There are known unknowns. That is to say, there are things that we now know we don’t know. But there are also unknown unknowns. These are things we do not know we don’t know.” As we ponder over the motives behind the Ivorian claim we should also ask, is this a case of known knowns or known unknowns or unknown unknowns? Reports that our western neighbour Ivory Coast is said to have laid claims before the UN to portions of our oil find in the deep waters of the Western Region is worrisome to every Ghanaian everywhere. That our government is now rushing a bill through parliament to establish the Ghana Boundary Commission to undertake negotiations with the Ivory Coast to determine and demarcate Ghana’s land boundaries and de-limit Ghana’s maritime boundaries, even more worrying. Indeed it is an intriguing paradox that given all the frenetic activity of government, policy initiatives, draft bills and large-scale symposiums and seminars on ‘oil and gas’ since mid 2007, the prospects of a neighbour claiming parts of our continental shelf, and for that matter securing the oil fields has never been considered. That government is surprised by the Ivoirians’ move is itself surprising therefore. This is a classic failure by our intelligence services and like the Japanese attack on the United States of America in 1941, this may well turn out to be our ‘Pearl Harbour’

Amidst this worrying state of affairs is the knowledge that though steps are being taken on the national level, nothing thus far has been done on the international front to register our displeasure of this illegitimate claim and our preparedness to safeguard this strategic national asset of ours, come what may. In international matters of this nature, time is of the essence.

We should have by now raced the amber flag too: that is, dispatched our navy to the disputed area, tabled a counter statement at the UN, summoned the Ivorian ambassador to the Jubilee House (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) to explain the basis of their claim, and have the president address the nation stating the government’s measures to retain and protect the 200 nautical miles of our continental shelf and the oil wells. This would have sent a clear and unequivocal message to the Ivoirians that their decision is indeed a clear case of miscalculation as well as assure every Ghanaian everywhere of the security of the wells.

International relations is less about negotiations and more about games. Thus when the Ivoirians raced the red flag days after the United States operator Vanco struck oil in the deep-waters –Dzata well, it is not so they can negotiate for a share of our oil but so they may ‘win’ a share of it. Because in games there is often a winner and a looser whereas in negotiations it is not often certain as to the outcome.

Eventually when the Boundary Commission is in place and we subsequently sit on the table with the Ivoirians, we would both be engaging in completely different diplomatic activities: whilst we would be negotiating, they would be playing a game: one known as rational choice in international politics where all decisions, crazy or sane, are arrived at by a 'rational' process of weighing costs against benefits. It is important for our team to note that in rationalism, there are no connotations of normative behaviour. That is there are no ethical, moral, cultural, or religious considerations in the decision making process.

So whilst we would be negotiating “with our brothers and sisters”, the Ivoirians will simply be “playing” with a competitor. You don’t enter into a boxing ring “with our brothers and sisters” unless you are prepared to hit and hit hard enough to win otherwise you would have lost before the match begun. With the talk of “our brothers and sisters” being expounded by our authorities, the Ivoirians are already aware that Ghana is not prepared to hit hard and so the cost of engaging us is far less than they stand to gain. The only conceivable cost to the Ivoirians in this case is perhaps that of hosting our delegation and of cause the time they will spend on the “negotiating” table- a trillionth fraction of the benefits of an oil well.

Therefore, in the absence of a firm public statement from government except that “a national Boundaries Commission will be put in place that would engage our neighbours in La Cote d’Ivoire with a view of negotiating our maritime boundary between ourselves and our brothers in Ivory Coast” as was put forward by the Lands and Natural Resources Minister Collins Dauda is like passing a ball when indeed it is not in your interest to play the game. One simply protects what belongs to him or her not negotiate for it. The Dzata Well is over 200 kilometres away from Ghana’s maritime boundary with cote-d’Ivoire. A boundary though not clearly demarcated but nonetheless has been respected by both Ghana and Ivory Coast for years. In a sense therefore the Ivoirians do not have their eyes on the Dzata well but on the Jubilee field itself since it is about 60 kilometres away from Ivory Coast.

Hence the timing and the logic behind the Ivoirians claim prompts one that it is not a decision that was taken overnight but one that has been hatched and nursed for a long time, probably since the day we amateurishly made known to the world our oil discovery in the jubilee field.

Amateurish- because in other jurisdictions where the leaders have the nations’ interest at heart and not necessarily bent on awarding contracts, and consumed by the thought of enriching themselves would have intelligently put a lid on an ‘intelligence product’ such as an oil discovery in an area that is not clearly demarcated. This would have placed Ghana in a strategic position to negotiate the boundary quickly. Ivory Coast, who would not have had wind then of any oil potential in the area would be less motivated by the fish than they are of the oil. Admittedly, hindsight is not wisdom but second guessing sometimes provides the most valuable intelligence product. We should have at least guessed and guessed well! Amateurish- because in other jurisdictions where the intelligence services are highly professional in nature and in practice; intelligence services that are well resourced with qualified and well trained personnel on the collection, processing, analysis and dissemination of intelligence would have picked signals of this coming and advised government accordingly. It appears President Gbagbo’s visit last December was the grand finale of a chain of strategic measures put in place by the Ivoirians towards making this claim. First, they would have probably by now illegally shifted our land boundary coordinates, accessed our leadership and negotiating style, examined our economic and military might and concluded the process by giving the national U-20 team, Black Satellites, a presidential reception at the Ivorian capital for winning the World Cup to harness positive public opinion.

Whatever they may or may not have considered before making this hostile claim, we take solace in the fact that it is a case of ‘known knowns’- that is we now know the intentions of the Ivory Coast regarding our oil. But there are also “known unknowns”, which is what we must be weary of: that is there are things we must know that we don’t know- for example the intentions of our other neighbours, i.e. Togo and Benin. The efficacy of our assessment of and response to both their intentions presents the bridge between us and the “unknown unknowns” state of affairs. That is, not knowing that we don’t know. This is the worst case scenario in decision analysis and for policy initiatives and must be avoided at all cost.