The Central Intelligence Agency?s role in Kwame Nkrumah?s ouster has been grossly overstated for a long time, and in more recent years, dangerously exaggerated on account of declassified documents from Lyndon Johnson?s presidency.
Today we will put that issue to rest ? you and I will face the facts.
Our children deserve to know the whole story, the truth, untainted by skepticism and cynicism. Before I do that, however, let me make a few points very clear for those amongst us who find it hard to assume a point of view outside their narrow convictions. I have always felt and believed that Kwame Nkrumah was a great man, who had big dreams, but stumbled like many other well-intentioned leaders in history who carried loads much heavier than themselves. There?s no question his noble cause was derailed by difficult circumstances created partly of his own doing and that of his countrymen. In any case, he was a man light years beyond his time, and Ghanaians must be proud of him.
Secondly, I have little regard for the conspirators who overthrew Nkrumah. They were motivated by greed ? just like the many coup plotters who came after them.
Let's move on.
Yes, the CIA knew of the plot to oust Nkrumah a year or so before it happened. But to conclude from this fact that they had direct involvement in the plot does little justice to the issue. That is the benefit of having good intelligence sources. The U.S. had clandestine agents in and outside the Nkrumah government; they knew what was happening; they knew the conspirators were meeting and gathering force, but purposely chose not to intervene throughout the process.
How do we know this? Well, the U.S. Ambassador to Ghana, in classified correspondences to the state department in Washington, suggested several times that he did not believe the conspirators ? who were then known by the intelligence services - were competent enough to carry out the plot.
The CIA made this categorically clear in classified notes: ?Ambassador Mahoney was not convinced that the coup d'etat, now being planned by Acting Police Commissioner Harlley and Generals Otu and Ankrah, would necessarily take place.?
Also, CIA documents show that the agent on the ground (whose name hasn?t yet been declassified) was reporting to headquarters, consistently, as someone observing the conspiracy from the outside, as oppose to within.
A May 1965 notation from the agent said. ?They (the conspirators ie Ankrah and co.) are NOW SAID to have only vague plans to act sometime in June or July. Public resentment against Nkrumah's domestic policies remains high, however.? Last spring and summer, restless military officers were REPORTEDLY set to move, but they procrastinated too long and Nkrumah was able to defuse the plot."
Please, note carefully, the agent?s use of the word ?reportedly,? which indicates that the arrangement was being passed on to him or her, instead of him or her, dictating the course of the arrangements. Note also the use of NOW SAID.
In fact, Ambassador William P. Mahoney believed that it was the deteriorating economic conditions that would push Nkrumah out of power. And he suggested that the U.S. contribute towards that economic starvation of Nkrumah?s government.
I admit that indeed reasonable minds can conclude that by choosing not to inform the Nkrumah government of a plot against it, the U.S. was in essence aiding and abetting the conspirators. But the truth is they had very little incentive to offer any help to Nkrumah and plenty of reasons to turn their backs on his administration.
Think about this very carefully. The U.S. was facing a growing threat from the Soviets and Communist China. Castro and the Reds were pounding on doors and mud huts in Africa looking to undermine U.S. interest. The conflict in Vietnam was brewing like a witches stew pot, and Nkrumah, amidst all of this, was branding the U.S. neocolonists even as his government was begging for a puny $15 million to sustain its operations.
What incentive did the U.S. have to fund Nkrumah when they could use the same money to support a pro-Western government in another African country that wasn?t looking to undermine the United States' interest?
The U.S adopted a lackadaisical attitude towards Nkrumah not because his personal continental ambitions. Anyone who thinks this is ignorant. Lyndon Johnson could have cared less if all of Africa was united as long as the continent wasn?t giving comfort to the enemy, the communists. Self preservation is something African countries can learn from the United States, because it is a quality to be admired in leadership. If the U.S. had continued to support Nkrumah, they would have been shooting themselves in the leg at a time when they needed to gain footing (pun intended) on the world stage.
Lastly, something must be said of the timing of the coup. The U.S. State Department expressed great satisfaction that the coup was conducted in the absence of Nkrumah. In fact, they were pleased that there was little blood shed.
When the NLC took office, the U.S. also took extraordinary steps to avoid further strengthening that military junta. They did not want to empower the soldiers any more than was neccessary, and made a point to stress, that U.S. funds should be used to feed the people, and not for the purchase of ammunitions.
It was important at the time to have allies during that turbulent era where the U.S. was on the verge of a nuclear showdown with the Soviets.
That was all that mattered to United States, and Nkrumah was an insignificant subplot in that drama.
Now you know the truth.
Views expressed by the author(s) do not necessarily reflect those of GhanaHomePage.
