Constitutional Accountability of Public Officials in Ghana: The case of the Finance Minister

Public accountability is a foundational principle of Ghana’s constitutional democracy.

Under the 1992 Constitution, public office is conceived not as a privilege but as a trust exercised on behalf of the people.

This principle is particularly significant in relation to the management of public finances, where the stakes involve national development, intergenerational equity, and economic stability.

The Minister for Finance, as the chief custodian of the nation’s finances, occupies a position of heightened constitutional responsibility.

This article examines whether, and to what extent, government officials, especially the Finance Minister, are required under the 1992 Constitution of Ghana to account for their stewardship at the end of their tenure.

Sovereignty of the people and the principle of accountability

Article 1(1) of the 1992 Constitution declares that “the sovereignty of Ghana resides in the people of Ghana in whose name and for whose welfare the powers of government are to be exercised.”

This provision establishes the philosophical basis of accountability: all public power is exercised in trust for the people and must therefore be justified to them.

Further, Article 35(8) obliges the State to “take steps to eradicate corrupt practices and the abuse of power.”

Accountability is thus not merely a political expectation but a constitutional imperative embedded in Ghana’s democratic order.

Economic governance and constitutional responsibility

Article 36(1) of the Constitution mandates the State to manage the national economy in a manner that maximizes economic development and secures the welfare of citizens.

Ministers charged with economic management, particularly the Minister for Finance, are therefore constitutionally bound to pursue prudent, transparent, and responsible fiscal policies.

Although the Constitution does not require a formal “end-of-tenure report” by ministers to the public, it creates continuous reporting obligations whose cumulative effect is post-tenure accountability.

The finance minister and control of public funds

The Constitution assigns a central role to the Minister for Finance in the control and management of public funds.

Article 179 requires that all public revenues be paid into the Consolidated Fund and prohibits withdrawals without parliamentary authorisation.

This provision ensures that the Finance Minister remains answerable to Parliament for every aspect of public expenditure.

Similarly, Article 181 subjects government borrowing and international financial agreements to parliamentary approval.

The Finance Minister must therefore account for the accumulation of public debt, the terms of loans, and the long-term fiscal implications of such transactions.

These obligations do not lapse upon leaving office; they remain part of the public record and subject to retrospective scrutiny.

Budgetary reporting and public record

During tenure, the Minister for Finance is required to present annual budget statements, economic policy reports, and supplementary budgets where necessary.

These presentations are not mere formalities; they constitute official disclosures of fiscal policy choices and outcomes.

Together, they provide a documented basis upon which the performance of a Finance Minister can be assessed after leaving office.

In this sense, the Constitution embeds accountability within routine governance rather than deferring it to a single terminal act.

Audit, surcharge, and Post-tenure liability

One of the strongest mechanisms of constitutional accountability is found in Article 187, which establishes the Auditor-General.

The Auditor-General is mandated to audit all public accounts and report to Parliament.

Crucially, the Auditor-General possesses disallowance and surcharge powers that apply not only to serving officials but also to former public officers.

This means that a Finance Minister may be held financially liable for losses to the state discovered after their tenure has ended.

Accountability, therefore, is not extinguished by resignation, dismissal, or a change of government.

Parliamentary oversight and investigation

Under Article 103, Parliament is empowered to establish committees to investigate matters of public interest.

Committees such as the Public Accounts Committee may summon ministers and former ministers to explain past decisions, expenditures, and policy choices.

Through Parliament, the people of Ghana exercise their sovereign right to demand explanations from those who managed public resources on their behalf.

Code of conduct and asset declaration

The Constitution further reinforces accountability through ethical obligations imposed on public officers.

Article 284 prohibits conflicts of interest, while Article 286 requires ministers and other public officers to declare their assets and liabilities before assuming office and upon leaving office.

The requirement of asset declaration after tenure is a clear constitutional acknowledgment that public officials must account not only for policy decisions but also for the personal financial consequences of holding public office.

Accountability to the People: Institutional but substantive

While the Constitution primarily channels accountability through institutions such as Parliament, the Auditor-General, and the courts, these bodies act on behalf of the people.

Accountability to Parliament and constitutional bodies is, in substance, accountability to Ghanaians themselves.

Therefore, even in the absence of a constitutionally mandated public address at the end of a minister’s tenure, the combined effect of audits, parliamentary scrutiny, asset declarations, and judicial processes ensures that public officials remain answerable to the people whose sovereignty they serve.

In conclusion, I would strongly suggest that under the 1992 Constitution of Ghana, government officials are unequivocally required to account for their stewardship.

For the Minister for Finance, this obligation is particularly stringent due to the constitutional control of public funds, borrowing, and economic policy.

Accountability is continuous, institutionalised, and enforceable even after a minister leaves office.

In constitutional terms, public office in Ghana carries enduring responsibility.

Tenure may end, but accountability does not.