Why the business community should champion the Constitutional Review Committee’s proposed reforms

On 26 January 2026, the Constitution Review Committee submitted its final report to President John Dramani Mahama. The Committee, chaired by Professor H. Kwasi Prempeh, Executive Director of the Ghana Centre for Democratic Development, was appointed in January 2025 with a mandate to undertake a comprehensive review of the 1992 Constitution and propose actionable reforms.

Over the course of a year, the eight-member Committee conducted nationwide consultations reaching over 114,000 citizens, received more than 820 written submissions, and engaged stakeholders ranging from former Presidents and Chief Justices to market women, farmers, and youth groups across ten zonal engagements.

The resulting 569-page report, titled “Transforming Ghana: From an Electoral Democracy to a Developmental Democracy,” contains over 200 recommendations spanning the presidency, Parliament, the judiciary, local government, human rights, and national security.

The report has attracted considerable public attention for its proposals on presidential term length, the election of district chief executives, and judicial reform. What has received far less attention is the substantial body of proposals that bear directly on Ghana’s fiscal architecture, land governance, natural resource management, public finance discipline, and national development planning.

These are proposals that, if implemented, would reshape the operating environment for private enterprise in fundamental ways.

Ghana’s business and financial community has grown accustomed to treating constitutional reform as a matter for lawyers and politicians. That instinct is misplaced.

The structural conditions that make Ghana a difficult environment for sustained private sector growth, from macroeconomic volatility and land tenure insecurity to opaque resource contracting and a politicised public service, are not simply policy failures.

Many of them are constitutional design failures, and the Prempeh Commission has identified them as such. This article isolates the key financial, fiscal, economic, and developmental reforms in the report and makes the case that the business community has a direct and material interest in seeing them through.

The Fiscal Crisis as a Constitutional Problem

Ghana’s fiscal record under the Fourth Republic is grim. Since 1992, the country has entered into 17 programmes with the International Monetary Fund, remaining under active IMF supervision for 40 of its 68 years of independent existence. In 2022, the country defaulted on its sovereign debt for the first time in its history, with public debt reaching 92.6 per cent of GDP.

The total government revenue-to-GDP ratio stands at 15.8 per cent, well below the sub-Saharan African average of 20.5 per cent and the developing world average of 22.6 per cent. Three spending items alone, being public sector compensation, interest payments, and statutory transfers, consume 70 per cent of total public expenditure. These numbers are not accidents of policy.

They reflect, in large part, a constitutional architecture that permits rather than constrains fiscal behaviour.

The Prempeh Committee identifies a critical design flaw in Chapter 13 of the 1992 Constitution, which governs public finance. The provisions are, in the Committee’s language, “generally enabling or permissive, as opposed to regulatory or constraining.” In essence, the Constitution as it exists, does not proceed on a disciplinary thinking as regards public finance.

The consequence is a constitutional order that provides almost no structural resistance to procyclical spending, election-year profligacy, or the accumulation of arrears through unauthorised commitments. For the business community, our history confirms that this often translates directly into macroeconomic volatility, unpredictable exchange rates, high borrowing costs, crowding out of private credit, and a government that is perpetually a poor payer of its own debts.

Medium-Term Fiscal Frameworks: Anchoring the Budget

One of the Committee’s most consequential fiscal proposals is the constitutional requirement for a medium-term economic framework to be laid before Parliament at least two months before the annual budget.

This framework would include medium-term projections for macroeconomic variables (GDP growth, debt-to-GDP ratios, inflation), projections for revenues, expenditures, deficits, and debt, and a fiscal strategy with targets over a three-to-five year horizon. Parliament would be required to approve the framework by resolution before proceeding to consider the Appropriation Bill.

Ghana has used a variant of the Medium-Term Expenditure Framework since 1999, but it has functioned as an in-house planning tool rather than as a binding constraint on fiscal behaviour. Elevating it to constitutional status would transform it from an executive instrument into a parliamentary accountability mechanism.

For business, the implication is straightforward: government budgets would be anchored in forward-looking fiscal commitments that are publicly debated, democratically approved, and subject to scrutiny. This creates a more predictable fiscal environment, reduces the frequency of mid-year fiscal shocks, and provides the private sector with credible medium-term information against which to plan investment.

Taming Extra-Budgetary Spending and Statutory Funds

A persistent problem for Ghana’s fiscal management has been the proliferation of spending outside the Consolidated Fund and the budget. Public entities relying on internally generated funds operate outside the Treasury Single Account, limiting the Finance Ministry’s ability to monitor cash flows.

Meanwhile, the multiplication of earmarked statutory funds has created fiscal rigidities that narrow the government’s fiscal space.

The Committee proposes several amendments to address these issues. The amount of internally generated funds a public entity may retain would require annual parliamentary authorisation through the Appropriation Act.

Parliament would set an aggregate cap on earmarked funds as a percentage of total tax revenue. All earmarked funds would carry sunset clauses, lapsing upon expiry unless renewed by Parliament on reasoned request from the Minister for Finance.

For the business community, the significance of these proposals lies in their potential to improve the government’s cash management. When government cannot optimise its cash resources, arrears accumulate in one area while profligate spending continues elsewhere.

Contractors go unpaid, procurement processes stall, and private sector confidence in government as a commercial counterpart erodes. A constitutionally mandated discipline over extra-budgetary spending addresses this directly.

Tax Exemptions: Transparency and a Ceiling

Tax exemptions cost the country an estimated 3.9 per cent of GDP in 2021, with VAT exemptions alone accounting for 1.9 per cent. Import duty exemptions further reduce the revenue base.

The Committee proposes that the Minister for Finance be required to set an annual ceiling on tax exemptions in the Appropriation Bill, submit an Annual Tax Expenditure Statement to Parliament (including a five-year retrospective analysis of exemptions granted and benefits derived), and maintain a contemporaneous public record of each exemption granted together with its justification.

The proposal also prohibits the grant of tax exemptions to public officers by virtue of their office. This reform has a dual relevance for business. First, it injects transparency into an area long characterised by opacity and discretionary decision-making, reducing the scope for corruption and rent-seeking.

Second, it creates a framework within which the business community can engage more constructively with tax policy, armed with data on the actual costs and returns of the exemption regime.

The Controller and Accountant-General: Constitutional Gatekeeping

Perhaps the most underappreciated fiscal proposal in the report is the constitutional recognition and empowerment of the Controller and Accountant-General.

The Committee proposes that this officer be appointed for a single, non-renewable term of 10 years, be designated the chief accounting officer of government, and be required to approve all withdrawals from and commitments against public funds before they take effect.

The critical innovation is the extension of this gatekeeping function to commitments, not merely expenditures. Ghana’s fiscal indiscipline is not limited to unauthorised spending; it extends to the incurrence of commitments that do not involve immediate cash outflow but create future payment obligations.

The accumulation of arrears through such unauthorised commitments has been, in the Committee’s words, “a significant problem plaguing Ghana’s PFM system.” For the private sector, which bears the cost of government arrears through delayed payments, disrupted supply chains, and liquidity pressures, a constitutionally empowered gatekeeper over government commitments could substantially improve the reliability of government as a commercial partner.

Borrowing, Debt Management, and Central Bank Independence

The Committee recommends that Parliament enact legislation establishing a public debt management framework, including debt anchors or fiscal sustainability rules. All contingent liabilities, including those arising from guarantees, public-private partnerships, and the obligations of state-owned enterprises, would be disclosed to Parliament.

On central bank independence, the Committee confronts directly the problem of monetary financing, the practice by which governments pressure the Bank of Ghana to provide direct advances that blur the boundary between fiscal and monetary policy.

Under the proposal, the Bank of Ghana could not carry out a directive to grant advances to government unless the directive is in writing from the Minister for Finance, authorised under an emergency clause in law, and approved by Parliament by a 60 per cent majority. The parliamentary committee responsible for finance would also gain quarterly access to the Bank’s foreign exchange receipts and payments.

For business, these proposals address two persistent concerns. The first is debt sustainability. Ghana’s 2022 default demonstrated the catastrophic consequences of unconstrained borrowing, including the domestic debt exchange programme that imposed significant losses on financial institutions and pension funds. A constitutional framework for debt management would reduce the probability of such events recurring.

The second is monetary stability. Monetary financing has been a primary driver of inflation and currency depreciation, both of which directly erode business competitiveness and investor confidence. Constitutional constraints on this practice would strengthen the central bank’s capacity to deliver price stability.

Land Tenure Reform: Unlocking Capital

The Committee’s land reform proposals have far-reaching implications for the business environment. At their core, they seek to replace the current system of symbolic presidential vesting of public lands with a framework of popular ownership, fiduciary management, and institutional accountability.

Public lands would be vested in the people of Ghana rather than in the President. The Lands Committee would be reconstituted as the primary constitutional trustee and manager of public lands, grounded in fiduciary principles of loyalty, transparency, and prevention of waste. Mandatory annual audits, public registers of land allocations, and strengthened parliamentary oversight would accompany these changes.

For property and real estate markets, the proposals address the pervasive problem of land tenure insecurity. Multiple registrations, overlapping claims, protracted disputes, weak boundary certainty, and chronic delays in registration impose transaction costs that suppress investment, inflate the cost of doing business, and deter foreign capital.

The Committee’s recommendation to allow Parliament to determine the Lands Committee’s internal composition through legislation, rather than constitutionally fixing it, would enable the institution to incorporate expertise in cadastral management, digital land registration, and dispute prevention, all essential for a modern land economy.

The reform of compulsory acquisition is equally significant. The Committee proposes that acquisition not proceed unless compensation funds have been assessed, secured, and appropriated in advance. The use of compulsory acquisition for private commercial purposes would be expressly prohibited. Land acquired for a stated public purpose would revert if that purpose is not commenced within a defined period.

These safeguards address the persistent abuse of compulsory acquisition that has destabilised property rights, discouraged productive investment, and fuelled land conflicts.

Non-Citizen Land Interests: Pragmatic Adjustment

The Committee proposes pragmatic adjustments to the framework governing foreign land interests. Agreements purporting to grant freehold interests to non-citizens would no longer be rendered void; instead, they would automatically convert into 50-year leaseholds.

Leases exceeding the constitutional maximum would be automatically reduced rather than invalidated. A narrow carve-out would accommodate joint ownership between citizens and non-citizen spouses.

The proposal to elevate to constitutional status the existing statutory provision that treats a company as a non-citizen if more than 40 per cent of its equity is held by non-citizens provides welcome certainty. Companies with 60 per cent or greater Ghanaian shareholding would be classified as Ghanaian and could acquire proprietary interests exceeding 50 years.

This clarity benefits both foreign investors, who gain predictability, and Ghanaian businesses, who retain structural advantages in property acquisition.

Natural Resources: From Extraction to Development

The Committee’s natural resource proposals introduce a comprehensive framework of principles to govern mineral and resource exploitation. These include collective ownership, fiduciary responsibility, intergenerational equity, sustainability, the precautionary principle, transparency, democratic oversight, and free, prior, and informed consent.

For the extractive industries, two proposals are of particular importance. First, parliamentary ratification of natural resource agreements would become a two-stage process: prior approval of proposed terms before execution, followed by post-execution confirmation that the final agreement conforms to the approved terms.

Agreements that have not completed this process would have no legal effect, and no operational activities could commence on the basis of unapproved agreements. This addresses the longstanding practice whereby resource agreements are negotiated, executed, and operationalised before Parliament has exercised any meaningful oversight.

Second, a defined percentage of gross mineral revenue would be allocated directly to host communities for infrastructure, human development, and environmental remediation. The use of gross rather than net revenue is designed to prevent revenue erosion through transfer pricing and cost inflation.

For mining companies, this creates a clearer social licence framework, potentially reducing community conflict and operational disruptions. For the broader economy, it addresses the paradox of mineral-rich but persistently impoverished mining communities that fuels illegal mining and environmental destruction.

The proposal for a Natural Resources Coordinating Authority, modelled on the State Interests and Governance Authority, would address the fragmentation that allows mining concessions to be granted without consideration of their impact on water resources, forest conservation, agricultural land use, or food security.

For agribusiness and other sectors whose operations are affected by extractive decisions, this coordinating mechanism offers a pathway to more balanced resource governance.

National Development Planning: Binding the Plan to the Budget

The Committee proposes to require a long-term National Development Plan, spanning up to 25 years, to be approved by Parliament by a two-thirds majority. Annual budgets would be required to demonstrate alignment with this plan. The President would submit annual written reports on progress toward plan objectives.

Political parties would be required to publish, six months before a general election, manifestoes setting out how they propose to fulfil the plan’s objectives, complete with indicative cost estimates and funding sources.

The proposal to amend the plan only through a process requiring two-thirds parliamentary approval, accompanied by written justification and public consultation, addresses the problem of development discontinuity, the pattern whereby each new government abandons its predecessor’s plans in favour of its own party manifesto.

For long-term investors, infrastructure developers, and firms whose planning horizons extend beyond a single electoral cycle, a constitutionally binding development plan would provide a degree of policy continuity that has been absent from Ghana’s governance.

Public Service Reform: Depoliticising the Machinery of State

The Committee proposes to remove the President’s power to appoint members of the public services, vesting that power instead in the governing councils of the relevant institutions, with chief executives appointed through open, competitive, merit-based processes.

No current holder of an office in a political party or political campaign would be eligible for appointment to any office within the public service. The Public Services Committee would be freed from the requirement to obtain presidential approval before making regulations governing its functions.

For the private sector, which interacts daily with the public service through regulatory processes, licensing, tax administration, customs, and procurement, a depoliticised, merit-based public service translates into more competent, predictable, and efficient government.

The Committee’s finding that Ghana’s public sector is “relatively capable and stable” but delivers “underwhelming” outcomes due to political interference, corruption, and low productivity suggests that the constitutional framework, rather than the quality of personnel, is the binding constraint.

State-Owned Enterprises: Governance at Last

The Committee notes that the Constitution’s existing framework excludes state-owned enterprises from its coverage, a gap that has allowed SOEs to operate without adequate governance standards.

The proposals to extend constitutional governance principles to SOEs, combined with the strengthened role of SIGA in natural resource coordination, would bring greater discipline to a sector that has historically absorbed public resources without commensurate returns.

An Independent Statistical Service

The Committee recommends that the Government Statistician be redesignated as the State Statistician and appointed for a single, non-renewable term of 10 years. This addresses the practice of routinely replacing Government Statisticians when a new government takes office, which undermines the integrity of national statistics.

For the financial sector, investment community, and any business that relies on government data for planning and decision-making, an independent statistical service is foundational.

The Business Case for Constitutional Reform

The proposals summarised here address, in specific and actionable terms, the structural conditions that have made Ghana a difficult environment for sustained private sector growth: fiscal indiscipline and macroeconomic volatility; land tenure insecurity and the high cost of property transactions; opaque and discretionary natural resource contracting; weak central bank independence and recurring currency crises; a politicised public service that prioritises patronage over performance; development planning disconnected from budgeting and subject to electoral disruption; and an exemption regime that erodes the tax base without demonstrable returns.

The Prempeh Committee has produced a constitutional reform agenda that is, at its core, a governance reform agenda. Good governance is good for business. The private sector’s silence on constitutional reform has been, in effect, an acceptance of the institutional weaknesses that constrain its own growth. That silence should end.

The business and financial community should engage actively with these proposals, through the Ghana Employers’ Association, the Association of Ghana Industries, the Ghana National Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the Ghana Stock Exchange, the banking sector, and the broader investment community.

Constitutional reform of this nature happens rarely. The opportunity to reshape the rules of the game in favour of fiscal discipline, property rights, institutional accountability, and long-term economic planning should not be squandered.