The fear of institutional independence by our strong politicians

The Electoral Commission (EC) under the Fourth Republic initially enjoyed a relatively high level of public confidence under the leadership of Kwadwo Afari-Gyan, who served from 1993 to 2015.

Although political parties occasionally challenged election results and aspects of electoral administration, criticisms were generally directed at specific electoral processes rather than at the legitimacy of the EC Chairperson's appointment. Afari-Gyan's long tenure contributed to the perception of institutional continuity and stability, and despite occasional electoral disputes, party politics had not significantly intruded into debates over the occupancy of the office itself.

A noticeable shift emerged in 2015 with the appointment of Charlotte Osei by President John Dramani Mahama following the retirement of Afari-Gyan.

As the first transition from the Commission's founding Chairperson in the Fourth Republic, her appointment attracted heightened political interest and scrutiny. While her appointment itself was historic, the EC leadership increasingly became a subject of partisan commentary, with political actors paying closer attention to the perceived political implications of appointments to the Commission.

The intrusion of partisan politics into EC leadership became most evident during and after the events leading to the removal of Charlotte Osei in 2018.

The circumstances surrounding her dismissal generated intense political debate, with competing narratives emerging from the major political parties regarding the independence of the Commission and the appropriateness of the constitutional processes employed.

What had previously been largely administrative and institutional discussions evolved into highly polarized political contests, drawing the EC leadership directly into partisan discourse.

The appointment of Jean Adukwei Mensa later in 2018 further deepened the politicization of discussions surrounding EC leadership. Opposition parties questioned the transition and raised concerns about neutrality and public trust, while supporters maintained that the constitutional requirements for appointment had been fully respected.

Since then, debates concerning the Electoral Commission have increasingly focused not only on electoral administration but also on the perceived political affiliations, independence, and legitimacy of its leadership. This development marks a significant departure from the earlier period when the EC was largely viewed as an institution operating above overt partisan contestation.

Thus, while electoral disputes existed during the tenure of Afari-Gyan, the politicization of the office of the EC Chairperson itself became more pronounced from 2015 onward and intensified considerably following the 2018 removal of Charlotte Osei and the appointment of Jean Adukwei Mensa.

The recent appointments to Ghana's Electoral Commission (EC) have once again ignited a familiar political debate.

The opposition has accused the government of appointing individuals with perceived partisan connections into positions that ought to be fiercely independent, while government supporters have responded by reminding the public that similar appointments were made by previous administrations.

Both arguments may contain elements of truth. Yet both miss a more important point. The real issue is not who made the appointments.

The real issue is why Ghana's political leaders, regardless of ideology or party affiliation, remain unwilling to reform a system that repeatedly generates controversy and undermines public confidence in critical democratic institutions.

The current debate exposes a deeper and more troubling reality about Ghanaian politics: politicians often defend principles only when those principles serve their political interests.

When in opposition, political parties become passionate advocates of institutional independence, transparency, and accountability. When in government, however, many of the same principles suddenly become negotiable. What was once portrayed as a threat to democracy becomes a constitutional prerogative. What was condemned as political interference becomes a lawful exercise of executive authority.

This hypocrisy is not unique to one political party. It has become a recurring feature of Ghana's political landscape. The opposition's concerns about perceived partisan appointments to the Electoral Commission are understandable.

The EC occupies a critical place in Ghana's constitutional order. It is the institution responsible for administering elections and safeguarding one of the most fundamental pillars of democracy: the will of the people.

For this reason, appointments to the Commission should not only be fair but should also be seen to be fair.

Public confidence in electoral outcomes depends largely on public confidence in the institution conducting those elections. However, the opposition's criticism is weakened by the reality that when it had the opportunity to reform the system, it defended the same constitutional arrangements it now questions.

The standards appear to change depending on whether a party is in government or opposition.

Similarly, the government's justification that previous administrations engaged in similar practices is equally problematic. The argument that "they did it too" is not a defense of principle. It is simply an admission that Ghana's political class has become comfortable perpetuating practices it once condemned.

A nation cannot progress by benchmarking its governance standards against yesterday's mistakes. What makes the present situation particularly disappointing is that it comes against the backdrop of the much-publicized Reset Agenda.

One of the earliest and most commendable actions of President Mahama's administration was the establishment of a Constitutional Review Committee (CRC). The decision was widely welcomed because it demonstrated a willingness to examine structural weaknesses within Ghana's governance system and identify reforms that could strengthen democratic institutions.

The committee undertook consultations across the country and submitted its report to government last year. Many Ghanaians expected the exercise to produce meaningful reforms capable of addressing longstanding concerns about excessive executive influence over public institutions.

This year, Cabinet announced its decisions on the CRC recommendations. While several proposals were accepted, many others were reportedly rejected. Significantly, a considerable number of the rejected recommendations sought to transfer key governance functions from political discretion to more transparent and independent institutional processes.

Among these were proposals relating to the appointment of Electoral Commission officials and other constitutional office holders. The recommendations sought to make appointments more transparent, merit-based, and less susceptible to perceptions of political influence.

The underlying principle was simple. The legitimacy of democratic institutions should not depend primarily on the preferences of political leaders but on systems and procedures that command broad public trust. Ironically, many of the reforms that would have most effectively advanced the objectives of the Reset Agenda were those that required politicians to relinquish some degree of control.

This is where Ghana's democracy confronts one of its greatest challenges. Politicians readily support institutional reforms when those reforms constrain their opponents. They become far less enthusiastic when those same reforms require them to surrender power themselves.

The reluctance to implement recommendations that would reduce executive influence raises legitimate questions about the political commitment to institutional transformation. If political leaders genuinely believe that perceptions of partisan influence undermine confidence in institutions such as the Electoral Commission, then one would expect them to embrace reforms that reduce such perceptions.

Instead, what emerges is the age-old instinct of political self-preservation. Across successive governments, leaders have demonstrated a remarkable unwillingness to cede powers that could prove politically advantageous in the future. The fear of losing office often translates into a determination to retain as much influence as possible over key institutions of state. Consequently, constitutional reform becomes an attractive campaign promise but an uncomfortable governing reality.

This continuous cycle has serious implications for Ghana's democracy. It breeds public cynicism and reinforces the perception that political principles are merely instruments of convenience.

Citizens increasingly view institutions through partisan lenses because political actors themselves encourage such perceptions through their inconsistent positions. Over time, trust in public institutions declines. Confidence in governance weakens. Democratic legitimacy suffers.

The irony is that Ghana possesses the expertise, experience, and democratic maturity necessary to build stronger institutions. Numerous commissions, expert panels, civil society organizations, and governance scholars have identified practical reforms capable of enhancing institutional independence and public confidence.

The obstacle is not knowledge. The obstacle is political will. Indeed, the true test of leadership is not the willingness to establish committees or commission reports. It is the courage to implement recommendations that may reduce the power of those currently in office while strengthening the Republic for future generations.

President Mahama deserves recognition for initiating the Constitutional Review process. However, the ultimate measure of success will not be the establishment of the CRC or the quality of its report. It will be the extent to which government embraces reforms that place strong institutions above political interests.

The ongoing controversy over Electoral Commission appointments should therefore serve as more than a partisan dispute. It should spark a national conversation about whether Ghana genuinely wants independent institutions or merely independent institutions when our preferred party is not in power.

Until politicians are prepared to subject themselves to the same standards they demand of their opponents, accusations of hypocrisy will continue to define our political discourse.

The debate is therefore not about the Electoral Commission alone. It is about whether Ghana wishes to build a democracy founded on strong institutions or one perpetually dependent on the discretion of strong politicians.

So far, the evidence suggests that while many politicians speak passionately about reform, far fewer are willing to surrender power in order to achieve it. And therein lies the unfinished business of Ghana's democratic reset. Business-as-usual continues.

By Dr. Paa Kwesi Eduaful Abaidoo

Sustainability Consultant and Lecturer