Volta River Authority: What I met and What I did - My tenure as Chief Executive of Volta River Authority
INTRODUCTION:
I was appointed Chief Executive of the Volta River Authority (VRA) on August 23, 2001, after a brief stint as the Authority’s Chairman. Right from the onset, there was enormous public interest in my association with VRA. The initial interest had more to do with my transition from politician/social advocate to a technocrat serving under President Kufuor’s administration, and what some perceived as my opposition to the NPP during the electioneering process/period. 2. Within a space of four months, the public interest in VRA’s affairs began to focus on the substance of my work with the Authority, especially the relevance and impact of substantial changes that were being introduced into the Authority’s operations. In a sense, the reaction of staff to the changes being made by what they perceived to be an outsider Chief Executive could be understood, even if the substance of the changes themselves was in the right direction. This reaction of the staff to the fundamental changes being made in the Authority was crystallised in the form of a growing spate of unprecedented leakage of official VRA documentation to the public, especially the media and the National Security Agencies.
3. Subsequently, the leadership of the staff groups made several allegations of impropriety and fraudulent conduct and mismanagement against me and acting through a series of mass meetings resolved that Government should terminate my appointment as Chief Executive, summarised in the now infamous statement of “WHOEVER BROUGHT WEREKO-BROBBY TO VRA MUST COME AND TAKE HIM AWAY”.
4. In response to the increasing levels of complaint and public interest in the affairs of the VRA, Government directed the Auditor – General to carry out a comprehensive investigation into allegations of corruption and impropriety made by the leaders of the staff groups. Whilst the Auditor – General’s investigation was going on, and in the midst of negotiations on new conditions of service for the period 2003 – 2004, some staff of the VRA led by the Akosombo Branch resolved to withdraw their labour until such a time that I was removed from office.
5. The Minister of Energy intervened in the matter and established a Committee of Enquiry to go into specific allegations made by the staff groups. Whilst this was going on, staff continued to agitate for my removal and the seriousness of this intent was manifested by a specific threat to shut down the entire power system if their demand was not met immediately.
6. On May 21, 2003, I took a decision to step aside from my position as Chief Executive during the term of the Committee’s work, and also to offer an opportunity for things to calm down. The National Power System experienced a total shut down at about 3pm on the very same day. Whether the shut down was through technical malfunction or an act of deliberate sabotage as publicly claimed by a member of the staff groups is yet to be firmly established. Nevertheless, a similar total national shut down was experienced exactly one week the same time after the first incident.
7. On June 18, 2003 the Minister of Energy, through the Daily Graphic summarised the findings of the Committee that he established. The gist of the Committee’s findings was that I had been cleared in all the charges of fraud and other related issues of staff welfare. Further investigations needed to be conducted on the other technical and financial issues, especially the procurement and the implementation of the Strategic Reserve Plant (SRP).
8. Whilst the Minister’s recommendation to the President was being reviewed by Government, a fresh campaign of vilification was initiated by the Ghanaian Chronicle, using information and documentation which had been provided by the Authority to the Ministerial Committee. The climax of the new phase of campaign against me came in a form of a banner headline carried by the Evening News of Monday, June 23, 2003, titled “WEREKO-BROBBY SACKED”. Not unexpectedly, the substance of the story had absolutely nothing to do with the headlines. The Minister of Information promptly refuted this claim in interviews granted to a number of radio stations.
9. So what is it that I have done, that has in the space of just 22 months under my stewardship, turned the VRA from a perception of an institution of exemplary performance and professional competence into the current state of near anarchy and the object of intense public interest?
10. This is the story of my tenure at VRA. It attempts to address the following important questions.
Ø What did I find at the VRA when I arrived there?
Ø What actions did I take to address the major problems that I encountered?
Ø What were the benefits and of course, the cost of the measures that I took to address the problems?
Ø What lessons do I believe have been learnt by myself and the staff of VRA? 2. ISSUES AND CHALLENGES 12. The onset of thermal generation which costs about 3 to 4 times the cost to produce the traditional hydro had began to compound and impact significantly on finances of the Authority. Uncharacteristically for VRA, the Authority had began to incur significant losses in its operations from 1997 – 2000. These losses were attributed mainly to the failure of the Authority coupled with the reluctance of Government, to ensure that the Authority was able to recover the full cost of its operations from increment in its tariffs. Indeed with the exception of major tariff increases in May 2001, whose success I assisted with in my earlier role as Energy Adviser to the President, the Authority had received no tariff increases since 1998 and the value of the tariff was diminishing rapidly with the deteriorating depreciation in the exchange rate and increasing inflation in the period 1997 – 2000. 13. Another factor in the transition was the need to transform the work culture in the organisation from its traditional focus on hydro to meet the new challenges of increasing thermal generation. Under the old order of things, the most significant and crucial dates in the Authority’s annual calendar, was the first day of November each year. On this day, the level of the Lake would have reached its maximum point, and the Authority was then in a position to determine, based on the projected demand of power from the following year, as to whether it could or could not meet its customer’s needs for the following year. With the exception of the 1983, 1984 and 1998 drought seasons, the Akosombo Lake had been able to supply all of the country’s energy needs. Indeed, in the years where inadequate tariffs delayed the construction and introduction of much needed thermal addition to the power system, the Authority relied on the Lake to produce more than its normal desirable output in order to meet the growing demand of its customers. (See APPENDIX I) 14. Under the all hydro regime, once the most important date had passed and it was deemed that there was enough water to produce electricity, the sense of urgency, timeliness and financial discipline were no more crucial. The certainty of enough water to generate power at a low cost coupled with the fact that the Authority’s revenues almost always exceeded its expenditures combined to create a culture and an environment where, proficiency and productivity were not crucial in ensuring the success of the Authority’s operations. 15. Since 1998 and the introduction of thermal power into VRA’s operations, the singular requirement for regular procurement of crude oil has required the Authority to significantly alter its working practices and relationships with its clients, suppliers and financial lenders. The Authority’s finances have moved from a surplus position in which it was not required to borrow money to finance its day to day operations because its revenues exceeded its cost, to a situation where it has been required for the past five years to borrow significantly from the financial market to meet its operational cash requirements, especially for the procurement of crude oil. 16. Also the need to operate the more technologically challenging thermal power plants, especially with the greater and more frequent need for maintenance, and the growing load on the transmission system, have all combined to require the Authority’s staff to undertake a fundamental change in culture of the organisation, their work practices and general performance of all staff. 17. The state of affairs at the time that I arrived at the Authority was an institution beset with many serious technical problems. Unable to secure the requisite financial resources to tackle these problems, a very demoralised and frustrated work force saw its only salvation in Government doling out money to enable it to keep going 18. That VRA continued to operate has more to do with its role as a strategic national developmental asset than as a result of its ability to address successfully the fundamental changes that were facing it in its transition from a hydro power company to a normal international power producer. 19. In the background to all of this, has been the ongoing effort by the Government, in partnership with international development agencies, to push for a fundamental reform of Ghana’s power sector, to make it more responsive to the needs of its customers, and to improve productivity and performance to the best practice found elsewhere in the world. 20. I have organised this account of my stewardship under five main areas which cover the major issues and the challenges of my stewardship of the Authority as: 2.1 TECHNICAL ii. Power supply to VRA’s major customers was characterised by high levels of instability, massive fluctuations and incessant power cuts. The consequence was that most consumers suffered serious damage to plant and equipment. iii. Critical generation capacity at Takoradi, which should have provided power in the wake of the low lake level, was not in operation. iv. There was a major constraint in the supply of power from the western corridor; as a result of long standing delays in the construction of the 161kV Prestea – Obuasi line. v. Power imports from La Cote d’Ivoire, which was to make up for the shortfall due to technical problems at Takoradi, was unreliable as a result of poor maintenance of the access route along the transmission lines between the Ivorian border and Ghana. 23. The major causes of the Authority’s financial problems were: ii. Difficulties to pay for power products from the major thermal suppliers namely CIE of La Cote d’Ivoire and the CMS of Michigan. iii. Difficulties to finance loans which the Authority has acquired for major capital developments and to finance operational activities. iv. Difficulties to obtain resources to finance the procurement of crude oil to meet the growing thermal component of the power supply. v. Mounting debts owed by our major domestic customer, ECG, and the Electricity Companies of Togo & Benin. 2.3 LOGISTICS: ii. Communication systems, essential for the widely dispersed staff of the Authority to keep in touch with each other, especially for monitoring the performance of the more than 4000 km of transmission lines, were largely obsolete. iii. Computers and other information and communication technical equipment were very inadequate. iv. The critical computer applications for carrying out the Authority’s business, especially, financial operations, human resources management, management of the transport sector, the control of stock and materials and the billing of VRA’s customers in the Northern Electricity Department’s area of operation were all beset with serious problems of unreliable performance and obsolescence. 26. Amongst the principal issues were the following:
Ø What are my hopes and expectations for my future and VRA?
Preamble:
11. I arrived at VRA at the time when the Authority was in the throes of a very deep and challenging period of transition in all of its operations. An Institution whose business has been built on production of power from the Akosombo hydro dam now had to face the reality of a significant and growing injection of thermal power into its operations.
21. The business of VRA is to ensure the reliable and un-interrupted supply of power to facilitate our country’s development. The state of the power system when I started work at VRA was characterised by the following: i . Very low level of the Akosombo Lake; at 246.36ft in August 2001 was about 34 ft. below the maximum operation level. This level was only 4.6ft above the minimum recommended operating level of 240ft.
2.2 FINANCIAL:
22. At the time that I took office, the VRA was technically a bankrupt organisation. The cumulative losses from the years 1997 to 2000 amounted to ¢ 1,430.4 billion and a projected loss for the year 2001 was estimated at ¢ 1,644 billion. i. Many years of low and inadequate tariffs which had exacerbated the Authority’s already worse financial base as the proportion of thermal power increase.
24. Inspite of the fact that VRA operations cover the length and breadth of the country with 41 substations dotted around the country, the level of logistical support that I found when I arrived at the Authority was woefully inadequate, extremely old and very unreliable. The following were the key areas of logistical deficiencies: i. A very old vehicular fleet which had not been renewed for about a decade. Essential maintenance work, especially on the transmission lines, had been reduced to emergency resolution instead of regular preventive work.
2.4 STAFF WELFARE:
25. I encountered a situation where staff morale was extremely low because of the long standing failure to resolve some of the most critical matters of staff welfare.
i. That promotions and increment for many of the staff had been left untackled since 1996.
ii. That vacation leave which had been deferred for many staff for many years, were still outstanding in terms of staff not being allowed to take the leave or to be compensated for the time.
iii. A substantial number of staff had been engaged on contract and casual basis for many years, some for as long as 15 – 20 years, and naturally they were unhappy about this development.
iv. Important infrastructural developments and renovations of the school facilities had been kept on the drawing board for several years.
v. Staff who were not provided with housing by the Authority faced increasing difficulties in securing funds to meet rent commitments.
vi. There appeared not to be a transparent and consistent Staff Development and Training Policy
2.5 PRODUCTIVITY AND CONTROL:
27. Whilst staff morale was low and could therefore be expected to have a negative impact on productivity and control of the Authority’s resources, I found a situation in the Authority which showed a fundamental weakness in productivity and growing laxity in the application and dedication of many of the staff to their work.
28. Amongst the principal areas of deficiency were:
i. Abuse of the use of Staff Provident Fund which has been established for the expressed purpose of assisting staff to prepare for their retirement.
ii. Inordinately high overtime claims.
iii. Misuse of Authority’s vehicles.
iv. Abuse of procedures on the use of Authority’s funds, especially claims for allowances and other financial controls.
v. Failure to retire imprest accounts for both domestic and foreign operations.
vi. Failure to implement the recommendation of audits carried out into various operations of the Authority
vii. A laxity in the enforcement of disciplinary procedures in the Authority.
viii. The abuse of the provisions of the leave of absence and the general conditions for the support of staff development and training especially, the breach of bonds by staff trained at the Authority’s expense.
ix. The absence of any form of procedures for measuring productivity of staff at various levels and accounting for the work that they do for the Authority.
2.6 MANAGEMENT STYLE:
29. When I arrived at VRA, the law was that, every decision was reposed in the person of the Chief Executive. This state of affairs produced a situation of a very remote ‘venerable’ chief executive who oversaw the activities of the Authority largely from the hallowed corridors of the 10th floor of the Authority’s head office.
30. Some of the problems associated with the style of management were:
i. The specific roles and responsibilities of the Senior Management, i.e. Deputy Chief Executives and Directors were not very clearly laid out and therefore, they could not be properly held to account.
ii. The level of contact between the Chief Executive and most of the staff was either totally absent or very infrequent. Indeed most of VRA staff outside of the head office in Accra and Akosombo/Akuse hardly came into contact with the Chief Executive.
iii. Most staff felt the absence of opportunities or any avenues to present their individual problems for consideration by the Chief Executive. For an organisation where the Chief Executive was the alpha and omega, it was understandable that most staff could feel that nobody else other than the Chief Executive could deal with their own problems.
31. The fore-going were the major issues and challenges that I took on when I assumed office as Chief Executive of VRA. The following narrative presents a succinct account of how I tackled these issues, the impact that came from them and the reaction that led to the current state of affairs. 2.1.1 TECHNICAL SOLUTIONS:
32. Notwithstanding the low level of the Lake and the engineering problem at the Takoradi Plant, I was firmly of the conviction that VRA needed to ensure that it did absolutely everything to keep the nation’s power system going. It was imperative that existing investors who would make the best ambassadors for this country and other prospective investors in the President’s declared vision of ushering Ghana into the Golden Age of Business should be assured of the availability of ample reliable power for their operations. It was also urgent that domestic consumers who needed to be persuaded to pay economic tariffs for the power that they consumed, should be assured that the power that was being offered to them was reliable, stable and above all continuously available.
33. In the above respect, the following major programmes were put into effect:
i. To repair and restore the generating capacity at the Takoradi Power Company to its full operation in the shortest possible time. This would enable us to generate thermal power cheaper than import from la Cote d’Ivoire and generation from the CMS Plant, and thereby reduce the cost and growing financial debt.
ii. Immediate and urgent action was taken to improve the reliability of the power supply by the acquisition and installation of essential maintenance equipment and operational changes to the management of the transmission system. These changes led to the restoration of the reliability of the system, which translated into a substantial improvement in the quality of power supplied to all consumers. The success of this measure is demonstrated by the fact that most Ghanaians now have nearly forgotten about the severe problems that they had with their basic domestic equipment iii. With the low lake level, power generation from the Akosombo dam was severely curtailed. Unfortunately, this could not be compensated for fully by the thermal power from Takoradi and imports from La Cote d’Ivoire. While the theoretical amount of power that could be available from thermal resources was close to 900 MW, only 450 MW could be delivered into the National Power Grid, because of the delays in completing the Prestea – Obuasi Transmission Line. iv. Uncertain as to when the World Bank would give the go ahead for the project to be completed, the Authority decided to use its own resources to fund the construction of the line at a cost of approximately US$ 8 million. Construction began on April 5, 2002 and the line was energised in May 2003, with the result that we are now able to draw an additional 200 MW of power from the western corridor. This development has vastly improved the flexibility for the management of our power supply and also enabled a further reduction in the drawdown of water from the lake, as an additional measure to improve the management of the Lake. v. Consistent with the policy to maintain the country’s power supply, rather than revert to the traditional practice of systematic and sustained load shedding, the Authority decided to fill the gap between the demand by its customers and the available generating capacity by leasing an Emergency Power Plant (EPP). The added objective of leasing the plant was to also assist in the management of the Lake by using the plant to produce power that would otherwise have come from the Lake. vi. Unfortunately, whilst the technical merits for the acquisition of the EPP (which later on came to be known as the Strategic Reserve Plant (SRP)), are sound and indeed essential for the success of the continuous power supply, the implementation of the project has been beset by a number of serious technical, operational and contractual problems. The result is that the immediate objectives of the Plant have not been successfully met, and a number of serious financial and technical issues remain to be resolved. However, the short to medium term usefulness of the Plant to meeting Ghana’s power needs on a reliable basis whilst nursing the Volta Lake back to normal health, continue to be legitimate and desirable.
vii. In an effort to ensure that the power system is able to meet the challenges of supplying all of the country’s power requirements for the next two decades, a number of important strategic projects are being put into place. Funds have already been secured from the Kuwait Fund to enable the construction of a 330kV transmission line from Aboadze to Tema.
viii. The project is necessary to alleviate the already choked transmission lines from the Western part of the country, which supplies all towns up to and including Winneba. When this project is completed within the next two years, it will be possible to evacuate a substantial proportion of the power produced at the Takoradi Plant and give additional flexibility in the effective management of the power system in the changing circumstances where thermal generation will continue to contribute a greater share of the country’s power system.
xi. Significant progress has been made in the development of the West African Gas Pipeline (WAGP). The Authority inspite of its difficult financial situation has been able to successfully meet all of its obligations of US$ 8.3 million as the foundation customer for the gas. In addition to this, the Authority has successfully taken over the role of the custodian of Ghana’s 16.3% equity stake in the Gas Pipeline Company and also met all the financial obligations necessary to ensure the continuous progress of the project.
x. These developments have led to the establishment of a concrete time table and a firm decision to go ahead with the project and to deliver gas to the Takoradi Thermal Power Plant (TTPP) by June 2005. The availability of gas at Takoradi and other Thermal Plants in Ghana should result in a substantial reduction in the cost of electricity generation from thermal sources. This will ensure that ample power can be produced in a cost competitive manner to assist the country’s industries to compete effectively in the sub-region and wider international market. xi. Significant progress has also been made to secure financing for other important infrastructural projects aimed at increasing the power generation and transmission capacities to meet the demand for the next twenty years. See Appendix II. 2.2.2 FINANCIAL SOLUTIONS: i. In November 2001, the Authority prepared and presented a Financial Rescue Plan for the consideration of the President His Excellency, J. A. Kufuor and the Government. The proposals contained the plan titled ‘Restoring the Financial Health of the Volta River Authority: Issues and Options’ were broadly accepted by the Government and have formed the backbone of actions being taken to address the Authority’s financial difficulties. ii. The Authority has made successful representations to the Public Utilities Regulatory Commission (PURC) with the result that there have been two major increases in tariffs in August 2002 and March 2003. iii. Substantial progress has been made to restore the Authority’s financial credibility with its two major power suppliers, CIE and CMS/TICO. The arrears of $ 55.6 million and $ 13.2 million which were owed to CIE and TICO at the time that I assumed office were cleared in total by July and December 2002 respectively. Unfortunately, the problems with our own generating capacity at Akosombo and Takoradi have resulted in the accumulation of more debts to our power suppliers. Arrangements have been made with Barclays Bank to pay off US$ 10 million of the TICO debt currently about US$ 19 million. Discussions are also on-going for a syndicate of Banks to pay off a substantial portion of the CIE debt currently amounting to US$ 32 million. iv. The increasing reliance on thermal generation has had a disturbing negative impact on the Authority’s finances. The main cost element is the procurement of crude oil to run the Aboadze Plant. When I assumed office in VRA, there was a lack of consistency in the procurement of crude oil. The average premium paid by the Authority to the supplier was US$3.50 per barrel bought. A decision was taken to put the supply of crude oil on tender as well as to separate the procurement of crude oil from the shipment of the product. As a result of this, the premium paid per each barrel of crude oil cover for both amounts to US$1.9 per barrel, this translates into a saving of US$1.38 for each barrel of crude that is purchased by VRA. v. For the period February 2002, to February 2003, the Authority procured 4.804 million barrels of crude oil. The net savings from this new arrangement was therefore US$6.65 million. With thermal generation contributing almost 70% to this year’s power supply needs, the net savings of the new arrangement will be expected to be much larger than what has already been achieved so far. vi. The inadequate levels of tariff resulted in a severe cash flow crunch for the Authority for the past several years. US$ 58.2 million of short to medium term loans have been arranged with both local and foreign banks to relieve the Authority’s cash squeeze and also to enable it to facilitate the payment of its debts to its major creditors. The timely repayments of these loans has engendered confidence in the banking and financial community who are willing to provide even more facilities to the Authority to assist it to emerge out of its difficult financial situation vii. Moreover, the restoration of the Authority’s credibility as demonstrated by our ability to service our debts, has removed the threat of power curtailment from our suppliers. vii. The overall effect of the measures taken to improve the Authority’s financial health have led to substantial improvement in operating cashflow and underlying financial position of the Authority, even in the face of the growing cost of thermal generation and the worsening impact of currency depreciation on our finances. 2.3.3 PROVISION OF LOGISTICS: 36. The first phase of a three year programme entailed the procurement of 166 vehicles, mainly cross country and double cabin pickups and 75 motor bicycles for the operations of the Authority. Vehicles were also procured for management staff covering Directors and Senior Managers who needed vehicles to carry out essential operations. See Appendix III. So mindful was I of the Authority’s distressed financial situation, that we negotiated substantial discounts on prices of the vehicles that we procured. In an effort to lead by example, I directed that expenditure on the Chief Executive’s saloon car should be substantially less than the sum spent on my predecessors. 37. It is therefore a matter of surprise that so much fuss has been made by the Chief Executive’s Volvo saloon car, which cost US$38,000, when the official vehicle, a BMW top range saloon, for my immediate predecessor cost the Authority US$ 95,000. The extent of public interest in VRA’s acquisition of vehicles was orchestrated by a section of the staff of the Authority. One therefore is entitled to beg the question as to why no similar fuss was made when my predecessor’s car cost at least 21/2 times more than mine and was purchased four years earlier than mine. 38. In response to similar complaints of the inadequacy and obsolescence of computers in the Authority, I arranged through competitive tendering processes for the procurement of 250 computers and 57 printers to help improve the Authority’s work. Vital communication equipment have also been secured for staff of the Transmission Systems Department to help to improve communication between staff around the very wide network of our operations. It is now the standard practice in the Authority for every shift team in the key areas of operations to have access to real time communication system. 39. A programme of work has commenced to upgrade and renew all the major softwares that underpin the Authority’s business. The Human Resource Management System (HRMS) which has been bedevilled with problems for the past five to six years is being revamped and upgraded to the latest version. In a departure from previous approach which affected the effective use of the software, all the critical users of the software are being given direct training to enable them to begin to use the software immediately. 40. The billing system for customers in the Northern Electricity Department (NED) which had become completely obsolete to the extent that it cannot generate bills more quickly than two to three months behind schedule, has now been completely replaced by a new PC-based billing software developed by local Ghanaian expertise. 41. Arrangements are also far advanced to upgrade the Materials and Financial Management softwares to enable the Authority to have timely and up to date information for the effective management and control of our operations. 42. In a special effort to address the growing financial problems of the NED, especially significant losses in the power distribution area, measures have been put in place to improve the billing and collection of tariffs for power consumed in the NED area of operations. 50,000 pieces of load limiters, a device that enables consumers to be supplied and billed for power consumption on a flat rate basis, have been procured and are being deployed for use by life-line customers. Additionally, 50,000 pre-paid meters have been ordered to enable a more effective billing of regular customers in the NED area of operation. The introduction of the pre-paid meters should improve the net cashflow and operating efficiency by eliminating completely the possibility of consumers using and not paying for electricity consumed. 43. In an effort to ensure that consumers can be supplied with power after the barest minimum interval following their application, and in an effort to support the development of local industrial capacity, the Authority has contracted a local manufacturer, selected through competitive bidding to manufacture branded cables for use by NED. 2.4.4 STAFF WELFARE: ii. Outstanding Vacation Leave – which had accumulated between five to seven years were resolved through mutual agreement. Half of all outstanding leave was commuted to cash payments whilst the other half was forfeited by staff. This exercise was necessary in the face of the reality that the staff could simply not take the outstanding leave without significant adverse impacts on the operations. By the same token, any attempt to cancel the leave without compensation would have met with stiff resistance. It could have taken at least 10 years to reschedule the accumulated leave and would almost certainly have impacted negatively on productivity at a time of major transition. This exercise cost the Authority about ¢4 billion but was hugely welcomed by the staff. Of course, after this a very short regime has been put in place in which every member of staff has been encouraged to take it or forfeit it, except at the approval of the supervising authority. iii. Staff Improvement Training Initiative (SITI) – This is a programme established in conjunction with Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology (KNUST) to offer opportunities for hard working staff at the technician level to obtain degrees at KNUST and thereby to obtain higher levels of authority and recognition in the VRA. The first batch of prospective students are currently undergoing an inception programme and the most successful will enter KNUST this October to commence their degree qualification. iv. Contract & Casual Workers - a clear breach of established labour laws and natural justice, VRA has been engaging a substantial number of casual workers for many years. All of these workers, some of whom have worked for as many as 15 – 20 years received no entitlements such as provident fund from the Authority. I Instructed that as many as the Authority’s establishment could accommodate of the casual workers who had worked for more than three years, should be made permanent and given the full benefits and entitlements of the normal Authority staff. v. Educational Grant & Loan - In order to assist staff to meet the difficult challenge of payment of school fees for their children, an Educational Grant of ¢1 million for one year has been introduced and paid to all staff. In addition, an Educational Loan of ¢3 million per year has been introduced with an interest rate of 2.5% to provide further assistance to staff to pay their wards fees. The interest rate of 2.5% is of course lower than the 6% interest rate that students of tertiary institutions have to pay for the loans that they receive from SSNIT. vi. Provision of Telephone Facilities - In an effort to improve the social life in all major areas of operations in VRA, telephones are being installed in all residential houses of staff who live in the Authority’s own houses. The service provides free internal calls within the VRA internal communication system as well as a user-pay access to Ghana telecom lines through the Authority’s communication facilities. The service for Akosombo, Akuse, and Aboadze has been completed and is in use, and plans are in place to offer similar facilities to other locations. vii. Construction of JSS Complex at Akuse - After 18 years of waiting, a full JSS Complex has been constructed at the Kpong Generating station at Akuse. With this the unfortunate and unacceptable spectacle of young people having to wake up at around 4:00 am, to be bussed to school at Akosombo has ceased forthwith. Extensive rehabilitation has also been carried out on the dormitories and classrooms of the Akosombo International School, which had been left in a deplorable state for many years. viii. Housing & Transportation Allowances - All staff who are not housed by the Authority now have automatic access to a loan to help them to pay for their rent as well as assistance from the Authority to deal with tenancy issues. In an effort to ensure greater equity in the treatment of staff between those who live in VRA’s enclaves and those who work in other locations, housing and transportation allowances have been introduced for all grades of staff irrespective of grade or location or work. ix. Welfare Bus - A staff welfare bus has been acquired for the Upper West area of our operations to bring them into line with such facilities which have been enjoyed by other areas for many years. 45. The Authority has taken over responsibility and cost of inspection of on-going buildings being financed for staff through the Staff Provident Fund. It is also assisting staff to acquire the necessary documentation on their properties by issuing letters to the Lands Commission and other governmental bodies to support the applications of staff 2.5.5 PRODUCTIVITY AND CONTROL 47. Working Hours – When I assumed office, VRA staff had work hours from between 8 am to 3 pm. This had been introduced in 1983, in the ‘Olonka’ days of food scarcity and other hardships. What was meant to be a short term experiment has carried on for more than 18 years. The irony is that even though the Collective Bargaining Agreement and the Conditions of Service for the Senior Staff stipulated a working week of 40 hours, the arrangement that was in place amounted to a 35 hours working week. 48. This was then followed over by several hours of nearly automatic overtime. One of the first measures that I took to improve productivity in the Authority therefore was to insist that the full 40 hours week that staff had signed into must be worked. This arrangement was introduced from January 1, 2002. 49. Provident Fund – the Provident Fund (PF) was established by the Authority to help staff prepare for their retirement. Specific uses for which the Fund could be put, especially the construction of retirement homes and purchase of land for economic activities were laid out in the Rules and Articles of Association of the Fund. Within three months of taking office, I found that the Rules for the disbursement of the PF had been set aside and the requisite documentation needed to corroborate that the funds were being used for the expressed purpose for which it was set up were not being provided in virtually all cases. 50. I found this to be clearly an abuse of public funds and took steps to insist that the Rules that govern the Fund must be vigorously observed. Upon representations by the staff groups for a review of the Rules, a Committee made up entirely of staff members was established to review the operations of the Staff PF and to bring recommendations for consideration and approval by the Board. The Committee’s major finding was that essentially the Provident Fund should be maintained as originally intended, with certain modifications in its operational management to improve the processing and documentation for staff application. 51. To demonstrate my commitment to the full functioning of the PF for its expressed purposes, I established a distinct section called the Provident Fund Pension Section (PFPS), to ensure the effective support to staff to enable them to access and use the funds for their retirement plans. I have also put arrangements in place to appoint staff welfare officers in all the major areas of operation to enable them process applications. 52. Excessive Overtime – the problem of excessive claim for overtime has dogged the Authority for many years. Indeed, documentation was shown to me detailing the various attempts by previous management to bring the claims for overtime under some manageable control. For reason that I was not able to fathom, but should now probably understand based on current events the recommendations for the various investigations into excessive overtime claims were never implemented by previous administrations. Given the very dire financial state of the Authority, I deemed it very urgent and necessary that every effort should be made to eliminate unjustified and unworked overtime. 53. The purpose of the exercise and the reversion to normal 40-hour week was not to abolish overtime, but to ensure that the overtime claimed was actually worked and therefore, deemed as essential. Also in line with the explicit statements in Collective Bargaining Agreement and Senior Staff Conditions of Service, measures are being taken to ensure that staff do not work inordinately long hours of overtime, so that their health would not suffer. It is interesting to note that one of the biggest health problems faced by staff of the Authority is hypertension and related disorders arising perhaps from not having enough time to rest. 54. Abuse of Vehicles and Mismanagement of Fuel – A measure has been introduced whereby all operational vehicles that belong to the Authority must be parked in designated places at the close of each working day. Failure to do so results in the sanctioning of the affected drivers. This measure has enabled the Authority to institute an effective control on the excessive use of fuel as well as reduce the spate of accidents which seem to afflict the vehicles belonging to the Authority that were used outside of the normal working hours. This was formerly not the case. 55. Abuse of Telephones - Controls have been put into place to check the abuse in the use of telephones within the Authority. A careful monitoring of the VRA telephone system reveals that as many as 20 members of staff had International Direct Dialling access in their resident homes without the expressed authority or permission of management of the Authority. Management staff of the Authority were provided with the use of telephones in their offices, homes and mobile phones without any explicit limits on the cost of the use. 56. Also many of the staff had automatic dial out access to Ghana Telecom through VRA’s communication system. Measures have been taken to eliminate all this waste and measures have been put in place for the proper control of this facility. Limits have been set for all management staff for all the phones they use, and dial out access in VRA’s communication system is now limited to specific users. 57. To Introduce Greater Transparency In Procurement – To ensure greater transparency and equity in the procurement of goods and services for the Authority, a re registration exercise was undertaken to open up the Authority’s suppliers list to all interested vendors, especially those who had hitherto been blacklisted and or prevented from registering with the Authority. A classic example was where staff sought to disqualify an insurance company whose quotation had been adjudged the best ‘because the company was not known to VRA’. 58. In addition, a monthly procurement magazine, titled ‘Volta Buy’ has been introduced in which is advertised all the major procurements being undertaken by the Authority. The magazine is available free to all registered suppliers at all the major operating centres. There has been some resistance among staff to the operation of the Volta Buy, since it has now removed the cloak of secrecy which surrounded some of the procurement practices. 59. Audits - As part of the efforts to improve the operation and efficiency of the Authority’s work, the number of specific checks through internal audits carried into the work of various sections have been stepped up. Since I assumed office a total of 75 such audits have been carried out and these have revealed very substantial slippages in the application of proper procedures, and the loss of several billions of cedis to the Authority. Rigorous enforcement of the findings and recommendations from these have clearly made some peoples lives uncomfortable. There can however, be no other way forward for an Authority that is so cash strapped. 60. Financial Discipline – The tightening up of lapses in financial discipline such as to eliminate: spurious claims for allowances, the abuse of travel and trekking per diem allowances, the failure to account for imprest for local and foreign travel, the failure to retire imprest taken out for specific operations on a timely basis has contributed to a substantial reduction and in some cases total elimination of waste of the Authority’s resources 61. Measuring Productivity – In the absence of a systematic mechanism for assessing the productivity and contribution of staff and departments to the work of the Authority, annual bonuses have hitherto been paid across the board to all members of staff. The payment of bonus had become a 13th month salary, since it was not related to any real measurement of the Authority’s performance for the year. Measures are now being put in place to tie bonus payments to demonstrative measurable indications of performance of individual members of staff, sections and divisions within departments, the departments themselves, branches of the Authority and ultimately the Authority itself. The era of blanket bonuses is over and each and every staff member is now being required to justify their job and the remuneration that they earn. 62. Enforcement of Disciplinary Procedure – Measures have been taken to ensure that rules and codes for the disciplined conduct of the Authority’s business are enforced in a timely fashion. When I joined the Authority, I discovered that a considerable number of drivers who had been involved in accidents for periods of more than 2 years were still waiting to be dealt with in accordance with the disciplinary codes of the Authority. There were also substantial lapses in other areas, in the implementation of the disciplinary code. This included the failure to complete the prosecution of an officer who had mis-appropriated up to ¢550 million of the Provident Fund (PF) of staff of the Authority. The conduct of investigations into disciplinary lapses still followed the laid down procedures but is now done in a more accelerated fashion. 63. It is clear from the fore-going that, I am enforcing and insisting on a higher standard of performance and conduct from all VRA staff. Clearly the net effect of all of this is perhaps seen by staff as a systematic slaughter of their sacred cows of many years of fattened breeding. Clearly this is almost tantamount to me causing a sacrilege and has certainly blinded them to the more positive benefits that my stewardship has brought to them and the Authority. 2.6.6 MANAGEMENT STYLE: 65. Devolution and Decentralisation (D&D) – Within two months of taking up my appointment, I introduced the management style of D & D into VRA’s operations. Under the D& D, departments are treated as self-managed cost centres, with each Director acting as the Chief executive Officer of their department, and their Deputy Chief Executives acting as the supervising Board members for the Branch. Levels of authority and responsibility which were all embodied in the office of the Chief Executive have been devolved to management, as have activities which hitherto used to be carried out centrally have now been decentralised to the major operating areas. Each Branch Head has also been given the direct managerial and supervisory control of all the management and staff under the various departments under their Branch. 66. The Chief Executive chairs monthly meetings at which reports from the Branch heads are received, discussed and decisions taken on a collective basis. Executive Directors have been equipped with their own departmental financial imprest and given their own departmental cheque books to enable them meet immediate and urgent operational needs of their departments without having to sit and wait for long periods while the centre deals with their needs and delivers them as soon as possible. 67. Contact with Staff – I have introduced a system of twice yearly durbars for all staff in all major operational areas of the Authority. Prior to this, visits by the Chief Executive to operational areas were few and far in-between, and staff durbars were clearly not a regular feature of the management functions of the Authority. 68. In addition to the twice yearly durbars, I have instituted a programme of one-on-one engagement with staff to address their own peculiar welfare and personal issues. To date, I have met more than 200 members of staff on individual basis and all the issues raised by them have subsequently been addressed even though not all have been solved. 69. Forcing the Pace – Deadlines: The norm in VRA in response to timeliness of deliveries has always been to promise to deliver ‘as soon as possible’. Clearly, in the changed circumstances whereby we need to find resources for our operations on a more frequent and regular basis, the laxity inherent in the ‘as soon as possible’ mentality cannot be allowed to continue. I have therefore insisted on instituting and demanding the adherence to deadlines for all major activities carried out for the Authority. I do admit that I do not take kindly to slippages in schedules and make my displeasure known in very strong and forceful terms. 70. Perhaps the way I come across may be sometimes intimidating for those who are not prepared to work for which one must naturally profess an apology, but I do not believe those who I worked closely with are offended by the style. 2.7 SO WHAT NEXT? 72. Unfortunately and despite my expressly stated declaration that, I have gone on political holiday, it has been difficult for people to separate my work of the last two years from the every day politics of the country. This is rather unfortunate as judgement of the merits or otherwise of my tenure as Chief Executive of VRA has more often than not been seen from a political rather than a technical perspective. 73. What I have done in this testament, is to put the basic facts of the issues, the challenges, the actions and the impact of my work over the past 22 months down. I have done so to put the facts before the people of Ghana who have been buffeted so much with the goings on at the VRA. This is my testament, and I put it before the people of Ghana and posterity to inform them and for them to make their own judgement. 74. When I joined the VRA 22 months ago, I made it very clear that I was not in for the long haul. I saw my tenure as short, eventful and lasting for five years at the most. Clearly, I do not believe that the challenge given me has been completely fulfilled. However, I took a decision 15 years ago to return to Ghana to serve and assist our nation’s development. I do not intend to abandon that commitment now or in the future. 75. What happens next is quite properly the prerogative of His Excellency, the President, J. A. Kufuor. Volta River Authority: What I met and What I did - My tenure as Chief Executive of Volta River Authority INTRODUCTION: 3. Subsequently, the leadership of the staff groups made several allegations of impropriety and fraudulent conduct and mismanagement against me and acting through a series of mass meetings resolved that Government should terminate my appointment as Chief Executive, summarised in the now infamous statement of “WHOEVER BROUGHT WEREKO-BROBBY TO VRA MUST COME AND TAKE HIM AWAY”. 4. In response to the increasing levels of complaint and public interest in the affairs of the VRA, Government directed the Auditor – General to carry out a comprehensive investigation into allegations of corruption and impropriety made by the leaders of the staff groups. Whilst the Auditor – General’s investigation was going on, and in the midst of negotiations on new conditions of service for the period 2003 – 2004, some staff of the VRA led by the Akosombo Branch resolved to withdraw their labour until such a time that I was removed from office. 5. The Minister of Energy intervened in the matter and established a Committee of Enquiry to go into specific allegations made by the staff groups. Whilst this was going on, staff continued to agitate for my removal and the seriousness of this intent was manifested by a specific threat to shut down the entire power system if their demand was not met immediately. 6. On May 21, 2003, I took a decision to step aside from my position as Chief Executive during the term of the Committee’s work, and also to offer an opportunity for things to calm down. The National Power System experienced a total shut down at about 3pm on the very same day. Whether the shut down was through technical malfunction or an act of deliberate sabotage as publicly claimed by a member of the staff groups is yet to be firmly established. Nevertheless, a similar total national shut down was experienced exactly one week the same time after the first incident. 7. On June 18, 2003 the Minister of Energy, through the Daily Graphic summarised the findings of the Committee that he established. The gist of the Committee’s findings was that I had been cleared in all the charges of fraud and other related issues of staff welfare. Further investigations needed to be conducted on the other technical and financial issues, especially the procurement and the implementation of the Strategic Reserve Plant (SRP). 8. Whilst the Minister’s recommendation to the President was being reviewed by Government, a fresh campaign of vilification was initiated by the Ghanaian Chronicle, using information and documentation which had been provided by the Authority to the Ministerial Committee. The climax of the new phase of campaign against me came in a form of a banner headline carried by the Evening News of Monday, June 23, 2003, titled “WEREKO-BROBBY SACKED”. Not unexpectedly, the substance of the story had absolutely nothing to do with the headlines. The Minister of Information promptly refuted this claim in interviews granted to a number of radio stations. 9. So what is it that I have done, that has in the space of just 22 months under my stewardship, turned the VRA from a perception of an institution of exemplary performance and professional competence into the current state of near anarchy and the object of intense public interest? 10. This is the story of my tenure at VRA. It attempts to address the following important questions. Ø What did I find at the VRA when I arrived there? Ø What lessons do I believe have been learnt by myself and the staff of VRA? 2. ISSUES AND CHALLENGES 12. The onset of thermal generation which costs about 3 to 4 times the cost to produce the traditional hydro had began to compound and impact significantly on finances of the Authority. Uncharacteristically for VRA, the Authority had began to incur significant losses in its operations from 1997 – 2000. These losses were attributed mainly to the failure of the Authority coupled with the reluctance of Government, to ensure that the Authority was able to recover the full cost of its operations from increment in its tariffs. Indeed with the exception of major tariff increases in May 2001, whose success I assisted with in my earlier role as Energy Adviser to the President, the Authority had received no tariff increases since 1998 and the value of the tariff was diminishing rapidly with the deteriorating depreciation in the exchange rate and increasing inflation in the period 1997 – 2000. 13. Another factor in the transition was the need to transform the work culture in the organisation from its traditional focus on hydro to meet the new challenges of increasing thermal generation. Under the old order of things, the most significant and crucial dates in the Authority’s annual calendar, was the first day of November each year. On this day, the level of the Lake would have reached its maximum point, and the Authority was then in a position to determine, based on the projected demand of power from the following year, as to whether it could or could not meet its customer’s needs for the following year. With the exception of the 1983, 1984 and 1998 drought seasons, the Akosombo Lake had been able to supply all of the country’s energy needs. Indeed, in the years where inadequate tariffs delayed the construction and introduction of much needed thermal addition to the power system, the Authority relied on the Lake to produce more than its normal desirable output in order to meet the growing demand of its customers. (See APPENDIX I) 14. Under the all hydro regime, once the most important date had passed and it was deemed that there was enough water to produce electricity, the sense of urgency, timeliness and financial discipline were no more crucial. The certainty of enough water to generate power at a low cost coupled with the fact that the Authority’s revenues almost always exceeded its expenditures combined to create a culture and an environment where, proficiency and productivity were not crucial in ensuring the success of the Authority’s operations. 15. Since 1998 and the introduction of thermal power into VRA’s operations, the singular requirement for regular procurement of crude oil has required the Authority to significantly alter its working practices and relationships with its clients, suppliers and financial lenders. The Authority’s finances have moved from a surplus position in which it was not required to borrow money to finance its day to day operations because its revenues exceeded its cost, to a situation where it has been required for the past five years to borrow significantly from the financial market to meet its operational cash requirements, especially for the procurement of crude oil. 16. Also the need to operate the more technologically challenging thermal power plants, especially with the greater and more frequent need for maintenance, and the growing load on the transmission system, have all combined to require the Authority’s staff to undertake a fundamental change in culture of the organisation, their work practices and general performance of all staff. 17. The state of affairs at the time that I arrived at the Authority was an institution beset with many serious technical problems. Unable to secure the requisite financial resources to tackle these problems, a very demoralised and frustrated work force saw its only salvation in Government doling out money to enable it to keep going 18. That VRA continued to operate has more to do with its role as a strategic national developmental asset than as a result of its ability to address successfully the fundamental changes that were facing it in its transition from a hydro power company to a normal international power producer. 19. In the background to all of this, has been the ongoing effort by the Government, in partnership with international development agencies, to push for a fundamental reform of Ghana’s power sector, to make it more responsive to the needs of its customers, and to improve productivity and performance to the best practice found elsewhere in the world. 20. I have organised this account of my stewardship under five main areas which cover the major issues and the challenges of my stewardship of the Authority as: 2.1 TECHNICAL ii. Power supply to VRA’s major customers was characterised by high levels of instability, massive fluctuations and incessant power cuts. The consequence was that most consumers suffered serious damage to plant and equipment. iii. Critical generation capacity at Takoradi, which should have provided power in the wake of the low lake level, was not in operation. iv. There was a major constraint in the supply of power from the western corridor; as a result of long standing delays in the construction of the 161kV Prestea – Obuasi line. v. Power imports from La Cote d’Ivoire, which was to make up for the shortfall due to technical problems at Takoradi, was unreliable as a result of poor maintenance of the access route along the transmission lines between the Ivorian border and Ghana. 23. The major causes of the Authority’s financial problems were: ii. Difficulties to pay for power products from the major thermal suppliers namely CIE of La Cote d’Ivoire and the CMS of Michigan. iii. Difficulties to finance loans which the Authority has acquired for major capital developments and to finance operational activities. iv. Difficulties to obtain resources to finance the procurement of crude oil to meet the growing thermal component of the power supply. v. Mounting debts owed by our major domestic customer, ECG, and the Electricity Companies of Togo & Benin. 2.3 LOGISTICS: ii. Communication systems, essential for the widely dispersed staff of the Authority to keep in touch with each other, especially for monitoring the performance of the more than 4000 km of transmission lines, were largely obsolete. iii. Computers and other information and communication technical equipment were very inadequate. iv. The critical computer applications for carrying out the Authority’s business, especially, financial operations, human resources management, management of the transport sector, the control of stock and materials and the billing of VRA’s customers in the Northern Electricity Department’s area of operation were all beset with serious problems of unreliable performance and obsolescence. 26. Amongst the principal issues were the following: i. That promotions and increment for many of the staff had been left untackled since 1996. ii. That vacation leave which had been deferred for many staff for many years, were still outstanding in terms of staff not being allowed to take the leave or to be compensated for the time. iii. A substantial number of staff had been engaged on contract and casual basis for many years, some for as long as 15 – 20 years, and naturally they were unhappy about this development. iv. Important infrastructural developments and renovations of the school facilities had been kept on the drawing board for several years. v. Staff who were not provided with housing by the Authority faced increasing difficulties in securing funds to meet rent commitments. vi. There appeared not to be a transparent and consistent Staff Development and Training Policy 2.5 PRODUCTIVITY AND CONTROL: 28. Amongst the principal areas of deficiency were: i. Abuse of the use of Staff Provident Fund which has been established for the expressed purpose of assisting staff to prepare for their retirement. ii. Inordinately high overtime claims. iii. Misuse of Authority’s vehicles. iv. Abuse of procedures on the use of Authority’s funds, especially claims for allowances and other financial controls. v. Failure to retire imprest accounts for both domestic and foreign operations. vi. Failure to implement the recommendation of audits carried out into various operations of the Authority vii. A laxity in the enforcement of disciplinary procedures in the Authority. viii. The abuse of the provisions of the leave of absence and the general conditions for the support of staff development and training especially, the breach of bonds by staff trained at the Authority’s expense. ix. The absence of any form of procedures for measuring productivity of staff at various levels and accounting for the work that they do for the Authority. 2.6 MANAGEMENT STYLE: 30. Some of the problems associated with the style of management were: i. The specific roles and responsibilities of the Senior Management, i.e. Deputy Chief Executives and Directors were not very clearly laid out and therefore, they could not be properly held to account. ii. The level of contact between the Chief Executive and most of the staff was either totally absent or very infrequent. Indeed most of VRA staff outside of the head office in Accra and Akosombo/Akuse hardly came into contact with the Chief Executive. iii. Most staff felt the absence of opportunities or any avenues to present their individual problems for consideration by the Chief Executive. For an organisation where the Chief Executive was the alpha and omega, it was understandable that most staff could feel that nobody else other than the Chief Executive could deal with their own problems. 31. The fore-going were the major issues and challenges that I took on when I assumed office as Chief Executive of VRA. The following narrative presents a succinct account of how I tackled these issues, the impact that came from them and the reaction that led to the current state of affairs. 2.1.1 TECHNICAL SOLUTIONS: ii. Immediate and urgent action was taken to improve the reliability of the power supply by the acquisition and installation of essential maintenance equipment and operational changes to the management of the transmission system. These changes led to the restoration of the reliability of the system, which translated into a substantial improvement in the quality of power supplied to all consumers. The success of this measure is demonstrated by the fact that most Ghanaians now have nearly forgotten about the severe problems that they had with their basic domestic equipment iii. With the low lake level, power generation from the Akosombo dam was severely curtailed. Unfortunately, this could not be compensated for fully by the thermal power from Takoradi and imports from La Cote d’Ivoire. While the theoretical amount of power that could be available from thermal resources was close to 900 MW, only 450 MW could be delivered into the National Power Grid, because of the delays in completing the Prestea – Obuasi Transmission Line. iv. Uncertain as to when the World Bank would give the go ahead for the project to be completed, the Authority decided to use its own resources to fund the construction of the line at a cost of approximately US$ 8 million. Construction began on April 5, 2002 and the line was energised in May 2003, with the result that we are now able to draw an additional 200 MW of power from the western corridor. This development has vastly improved the flexibility for the management of our power supply and also enabled a further reduction in the drawdown of water from the lake, as an additional measure to improve the management of the Lake. v. Consistent with the policy to maintain the country’s power supply, rather than revert to the traditional practice of systematic and sustained load shedding, the Authority decided to fill the gap between the demand by its customers and the available generating capacity by leasing an Emergency Power Plant (EPP). The added objective of leasing the plant was to also assist in the management of the Lake by using the plant to produce power that would otherwise have come from the Lake. vi. Unfortunately, whilst the technical merits for the acquisition of the EPP (which later on came to be known as the Strategic Reserve Plant (SRP)), are sound and indeed essential for the success of the continuous power supply, the implementation of the project has been beset by a number of serious technical, operational and contractual problems. The result is that the immediate objectives of the Plant have not been successfully met, and a number of serious financial and technical issues remain to be resolved. However, the short to medium term usefulness of the Plant to meeting Ghana’s power needs on a reliable basis whilst nursing the Volta Lake back to normal health, continue to be legitimate and desirable. vii. In an effort to ensure that the power system is able to meet the challenges of supplying all of the country’s power requirements for the next two decades, a number of important strategic projects are being put into place. Funds have already been secured from the Kuwait Fund to enable the construction of a 330kV transmission line from Aboadze to Tema. viii. The project is necessary to alleviate the already choked transmission lines from the Western part of the country, which supplies all towns up to and including Winneba. When this project is completed within the next two years, it will be possible to evacuate a substantial proportion of the power produced at the Takoradi Plant and give additional flexibility in the effective management of the power system in the changing circumstances where thermal generation will continue to contribute a greater share of the country’s power system. xi. Significant progress has been made in the development of the West African Gas Pipeline (WAGP). The Authority inspite of its difficult financial situation has been able to successfully meet all of its obligations of US$ 8.3 million as the foundation customer for the gas. In addition to this, the Authority has successfully taken over the role of the custodian of Ghana’s 16.3% equity stake in the Gas Pipeline Company and also met all the financial obligations necessary to ensure the continuous progress of the project. x. These developments have led to the establishment of a concrete time table and a firm decision to go ahead with the project and to deliver gas to the Takoradi Thermal Power Plant (TTPP) by June 2005. The availability of gas at Takoradi and other Thermal Plants in Ghana should result in a substantial reduction in the cost of electricity generation from thermal sources. This will ensure that ample power can be produced in a cost competitive manner to assist the country’s industries to compete effectively in the sub-region and wider international market. xi. Significant progress has also been made to secure financing for other important infrastructural projects aimed at increasing the power generation and transmission capacities to meet the demand for the next twenty years. See Appendix II. 2.2.2 FINANCIAL SOLUTIONS: i. In November 2001, the Authority prepared and presented a Financial Rescue Plan for the consideration of the President His Excellency, J. A. Kufuor and the Government. The proposals contained the plan titled ‘Restoring the Financial Health of the Volta River Authority: Issues and Options’ were broadly accepted by the Government and have formed the backbone of actions being taken to address the Authority’s financial difficulties. ii. The Authority has made successful representations to the Public Utilities Regulatory Commission (PURC) with the result that there have been two major increases in tariffs in August 2002 and March 2003. iii. Substantial progress has been made to restore the Authority’s financial credibility with its two major power suppliers, CIE and CMS/TICO. The arrears of $ 55.6 million and $ 13.2 million which were owed to CIE and TICO at the time that I assumed office were cleared in total by July and December 2002 respectively. Unfortunately, the problems with our own generating capacity at Akosombo and Takoradi have resulted in the accumulation of more debts to our power suppliers. Arrangements have been made with Barclays Bank to pay off US$ 10 million of the TICO debt currently about US$ 19 million. Discussions are also on-going for a syndicate of Banks to pay off a substantial portion of the CIE debt currently amounting to US$ 32 million. iv. The increasing reliance on thermal generation has had a disturbing negative impact on the Authority’s finances. The main cost element is the procurement of crude oil to run the Aboadze Plant. When I assumed office in VRA, there was a lack of consistency in the procurement of crude oil. The average premium paid by the Authority to the supplier was US$3.50 per barrel bought. A decision was taken to put the supply of crude oil on tender as well as to separate the procurement of crude oil from the shipment of the product. As a result of this, the premium paid per each barrel of crude oil cover for both amounts to US$1.9 per barrel, this translates into a saving of US$1.38 for each barrel of crude that is purchased by VRA. v. For the period February 2002, to February 2003, the Authority procured 4.804 million barrels of crude oil. The net savings from this new arrangement was therefore US$6.65 million. With thermal generation contributing almost 70% to this year’s power supply needs, the net savings of the new arrangement will be expected to be much larger than what has already been achieved so far. vi. The inadequate levels of tariff resulted in a severe cash flow crunch for the Authority for the past several years. US$ 58.2 million of short to medium term loans have been arranged with both local and foreign banks to relieve the Authority’s cash squeeze and also to enable it to facilitate the payment of its debts to its major creditors. The timely repayments of these loans has engendered confidence in the banking and financial community who are willing to provide even more facilities to the Authority to assist it to emerge out of its difficult financial situation vii. Moreover, the restoration of the Authority’s credibility as demonstrated by our ability to service our debts, has removed the threat of power curtailment from our suppliers. vii. The overall effect of the measures taken to improve the Authority’s financial health have led to substantial improvement in operating cashflow and underlying financial position of the Authority, even in the face of the growing cost of thermal generation and the worsening impact of currency depreciation on our finances. 2.3.3 PROVISION OF LOGISTICS: 36. The first phase of a three year programme entailed the procurement of 166 vehicles, mainly cross country and double cabin pickups and 75 motor bicycles for the operations of the Authority. Vehicles were also procured for management staff covering Directors and Senior Managers who needed vehicles to carry out essential operations. See Appendix III. So mindful was I of the Authority’s distressed financial situation, that we negotiated substantial discounts on prices of the vehicles that we procured. In an effort to lead by example, I directed that expenditure on the Chief Executive’s saloon car should be substantially less than the sum spent on my predecessors. 37. It is therefore a matter of surprise that so much fuss has been made by the Chief Executive’s Volvo saloon car, which cost US$38,000, when the official vehicle, a BMW top range saloon, for my immediate predecessor cost the Authority US$ 95,000. The extent of public interest in VRA’s acquisition of vehicles was orchestrated by a section of the staff of the Authority. One therefore is entitled to beg the question as to why no similar fuss was made when my predecessor’s car cost at least 21/2 times more than mine and was purchased four years earlier than mine. 38. In response to similar complaints of the inadequacy and obsolescence of computers in the Authority, I arranged through competitive tendering processes for the procurement of 250 computers and 57 printers to help improve the Authority’s work. Vital communication equipment have also been secured for staff of the Transmission Systems Department to help to improve communication between staff around the very wide network of our operations. It is now the standard practice in the Authority for every shift team in the key areas of operations to have access to real time communication system. 39. A programme of work has commenced to upgrade and renew all the major softwares that underpin the Authority’s business. The Human Resource Management System (HRMS) which has been bedevilled with problems for the past five to six years is being revamped and upgraded to the latest version. In a departure from previous approach which affected the effective use of the software, all the critical users of the software are being given direct training to enable them to begin to use the software immediately. 40. The billing system for customers in the Northern Electricity Department (NED) which had become completely obsolete to the extent that it cannot generate bills more quickly than two to three months behind schedule, has now been completely replaced by a new PC-based billing software developed by local Ghanaian expertise. 41. Arrangements are also far advanced to upgrade the Materials and Financial Management softwares to enable the Authority to have timely and up to date information for the effective management and control of our operations. 42. In a special effort to address the growing financial problems of the NED, especially significant losses in the power distribution area, measures have been put in place to improve the billing and collection of tariffs for power consumed in the NED area of operations. 50,000 pieces of load limiters, a device that enables consumers to be supplied and billed for power consumption on a flat rate basis, have been procured and are being deployed for use by life-line customers. Additionally, 50,000 pre-paid meters have been ordered to enable a more effective billing of regular customers in the NED area of operation. The introduction of the pre-paid meters should improve the net cashflow and operating efficiency by eliminating completely the possibility of consumers using and not paying for electricity consumed. 43. In an effort to ensure that consumers can be supplied with power after the barest minimum interval following their application, and in an effort to support the development of local industrial capacity, the Authority has contracted a local manufacturer, selected through competitive bidding to manufacture branded cables for use by NED. 2.4.4 STAFF WELFARE: ii. Outstanding Vacation Leave – which had accumulated between five to seven years were resolved through mutual agreement. Half of all outstanding leave was commuted to cash payments whilst the other half was forfeited by staff. This exercise was necessary in the face of the reality that the staff could simply not take the outstanding leave without significant adverse impacts on the operations. By the same token, any attempt to cancel the leave without compensation would have met with stiff resistance. It could have taken at least 10 years to reschedule the accumulated leave and would almost certainly have impacted negatively on productivity at a time of major transition. This exercise cost the Authority about ¢4 billion but was hugely welcomed by the staff. Of course, after this a very short regime has been put in place in which every member of staff has been encouraged to take it or forfeit it, except at the approval of the supervising authority. iii. Staff Improvement Training Initiative (SITI) – This is a programme established in conjunction with Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology (KNUST) to offer opportunities for hard working staff at the technician level to obtain degrees at KNUST and thereby to obtain higher levels of authority and recognition in the VRA. The first batch of prospective students are currently undergoing an inception programme and the most successful will enter KNUST this October to commence their degree qualification. iv. Contract & Casual Workers - a clear breach of established labour laws and natural justice, VRA has been engaging a substantial number of casual workers for many years. All of these workers, some of whom have worked for as many as 15 – 20 years received no entitlements such as provident fund from the Authority. I Instructed that as many as the Authority’s establishment could accommodate of the casual workers who had worked for more than three years, should be made permanent and given the full benefits and entitlements of the normal Authority staff. v. Educational Grant & Loan - In order to assist staff to meet the difficult challenge of payment of school fees for their children, an Educational Grant of ¢1 million for one year has been introduced and paid to all staff. In addition, an Educational Loan of ¢3 million per year has been introduced with an interest rate of 2.5% to provide further assistance to staff to pay their wards fees. The interest rate of 2.5% is of course lower than the 6% interest rate that students of tertiary institutions have to pay for the loans that they receive from SSNIT. vi. Provision of Telephone Facilities - In an effort to improve the social life in all major areas of operations in VRA, telephones are being installed in all residential houses of staff who live in the Authority’s own houses. The service provides free internal calls within the VRA internal communication system as well as a user-pay access to Ghana telecom lines through the Authority’s communication facilities. The service for Akosombo, Akuse, and Aboadze has been completed and is in use, and plans are in place to offer similar facilities to other locations. vii. Construction of JSS Complex at Akuse - After 18 years of waiting, a full JSS Complex has been constructed at the Kpong Generating station at Akuse. With this the unfortunate and unacceptable spectacle of young people having to wake up at around 4:00 am, to be bussed to school at Akosombo has ceased forthwith. Extensive rehabilitation has also been carried out on the dormitories and classrooms of the Akosombo International School, which had been left in a deplorable state for many years. viii. Housing & Transportation Allowances - All staff who are not housed by the Authority now have automatic access to a loan to help them to pay for their rent as well as assistance from the Authority to deal with tenancy issues. In an effort to ensure greater equity in the treatment of staff between those who live in VRA’s enclaves and those who work in other locations, housing and transportation allowances have been introduced for all grades of staff irrespective of grade or location or work. ix. Welfare Bus - A staff welfare bus has been acquired for the Upper West area of our operations to bring them into line with such facilities which have been enjoyed by other areas for many years. 45. The Authority has taken over responsibility and cost of inspection of on-going buildings being financed for staff through the Staff Provident Fund. It is also assisting staff to acquire the necessary documentation on their properties by issuing letters to the Lands Commission and other governmental bodies to support the applications of staff 2.5.5 PRODUCTIVITY AND CONTROL 47. Working Hours – When I assumed office, VRA staff had work hours from between 8 am to 3 pm. This had been introduced in 1983, in the ‘Olonka’ days of food scarcity and other hardships. What was meant to be a short term experiment has carried on for more than 18 years. The irony is that even though the Collective Bargaining Agreement and the Conditions of Service for the Senior Staff stipulated a working week of 40 hours, the arrangement that was in place amounted to a 35 hours working week. 48. This was then followed over by several hours of nearly automatic overtime. One of the first measures that I took to improve productivity in the Authority therefore was to insist that the full 40 hours week that staff had signed into must be worked. This arrangement was introduced from January 1, 2002. 49. Provident Fund – the Provident Fund (PF) was established by the Authority to help staff prepare for their retirement. Specific uses for which the Fund could be put, especially the construction of retirement homes and purchase of land for economic activities were laid out in the Rules and Articles of Association of the Fund. Within three months of taking office, I found that the Rules for the disbursement of the PF had been set aside and the requisite documentation needed to corroborate that the funds were being used for the expressed purpose for which it was set up were not being provided in virtually all cases. 50. I found this to be clearly an abuse of public funds and took steps to insist that the Rules that govern the Fund must be vigorously observed. Upon representations by the staff groups for a review of the Rules, a Committee made up entirely of staff members was established to review the operations of the Staff PF and to bring recommendations for consideration and approval by the Board. The Committee’s major finding was that essentially the Provident Fund should be maintained as originally intended, with certain modifications in its operational management to improve the processing and documentation for staff application. 51. To demonstrate my commitment to the full functioning of the PF for its expressed purposes, I established a distinct section called the Provident Fund Pension Section (PFPS), to ensure the effective support to staff to enable them to access and use the funds for their retirement plans. I have also put arrangements in place to appoint staff welfare officers in all the major areas of operation to enable them process applications. 52. Excessive Overtime – the problem of excessive claim for overtime has dogged the Authority for many years. Indeed, documentation was shown to me detailing the various attempts by previous management to bring the claims for overtime under some manageable control. For reason that I was not able to fathom, but should now probably understand based on current events the recommendations for the various investigations into excessive overtime claims were never implemented by previous administrations. Given the very dire financial state of the Authority, I deemed it very urgent and necessary that every effort should be made to eliminate unjustified and unworked overtime. 53. The purpose of the exercise and the reversion to normal 40-hour week was not to abolish overtime, but to ensure that the overtime claimed was actually worked and therefore, deemed as essential. Also in line with the explicit statements in Collective Bargaining Agreement and Senior Staff Conditions of Service, measures are being taken to ensure that staff do not work inordinately long hours of overtime, so that their health would not suffer. It is interesting to note that one of the biggest health problems faced by staff of the Authority is hypertension and related disorders arising perhaps from not having enough time to rest. 54. Abuse of Vehicles and Mismanagement of Fuel – A measure has been introduced whereby all operational vehicles that belong to the Authority must be parked in designated places at the close of each working day. Failure to do so results in the sanctioning of the affected drivers. This measure has enabled the Authority to institute an effective control on the excessive use of fuel as well as reduce the spate of accidents which seem to afflict the vehicles belonging to the Authority that were used outside of the normal working hours. This was formerly not the case. 55. Abuse of Telephones - Controls have been put into place to check the abuse in the use of telephones within the Authority. A careful monitoring of the VRA telephone system reveals that as many as 20 members of staff had International Direct Dialling access in their resident homes without the expressed authority or permission of management of the Authority. Management staff of the Authority were provided with the use of telephones in their offices, homes and mobile phones without any explicit limits on the cost of the use. 56. Also many of the staff had automatic dial out access to Ghana Telecom through VRA’s communication system. Measures have been taken to eliminate all this waste and measures have been put in place for the proper control of this facility. Limits have been set for all management staff for all the phones they use, and dial out access in VRA’s communication system is now limited to specific users. 57. To Introduce Greater Transparency In Procurement – To ensure greater transparency and equity in the procurement of goods and services for the Authority, a re registration exercise was undertaken to open up the Authority’s suppliers list to all interested vendors, especially those who had hitherto been blacklisted and or prevented from registering with the Authority. A classic example was where staff sought to disqualify an insurance company whose quotation had been adjudged the best ‘because the company was not known to VRA’. 58. In addition, a monthly procurement magazine, titled ‘Volta Buy’ has been introduced in which is advertised all the major procurements being undertaken by the Authority. The magazine is available free to all registered suppliers at all the major operating centres. There has been some resistance among staff to the operation of the Volta Buy, since it has now removed the cloak of secrecy which surrounded some of the procurement practices. 59. Audits - As part of the efforts to improve the operation and efficiency of the Authority’s work, the number of specific checks through internal audits carried into the work of various sections have been stepped up. Since I assumed office a total of 75 such audits have been carried out and these have revealed very substantial slippages in the application of proper procedures, and the loss of several billions of cedis to the Authority. Rigorous enforcement of the findings and recommendations from these have clearly made some peoples lives uncomfortable. There can however, be no other way forward for an Authority that is so cash strapped. 60. Financial Discipline – The tightening up of lapses in financial discipline such as to eliminate: spurious claims for allowances, the abuse of travel and trekking per diem allowances, the failure to account for imprest for local and foreign travel, the failure to retire imprest taken out for specific operations on a timely basis has contributed to a substantial reduction and in some cases total elimination of waste of the Authority’s resources 61. Measuring Productivity – In the absence of a systematic mechanism for assessing the productivity and contribution of staff and departments to the work of the Authority, annual bonuses have hitherto been paid across the board to all members of staff. The payment of bonus had become a 13th month salary, since it was not related to any real measurement of the Authority’s performance for the year. Measures are now being put in place to tie bonus payments to demonstrative measurable indications of performance of individual members of staff, sections and divisions within departments, the departments themselves, branches of the Authority and ultimately the Authority itself. The era of blanket bonuses is over and each and every staff member is now being required to justify their job and the remuneration that they earn. 62. Enforcement of Disciplinary Procedure – Measures have been taken to ensure that rules and codes for the disciplined conduct of the Authority’s business are enforced in a timely fashion. When I joined the Authority, I discovered that a considerable number of drivers who had been involved in accidents for periods of more than 2 years were still waiting to be dealt with in accordance with the disciplinary codes of the Authority. There were also substantial lapses in other areas, in the implementation of the disciplinary code. This included the failure to complete the prosecution of an officer who had mis-appropriated up to ¢550 million of the Provident Fund (PF) of staff of the Authority. The conduct of investigations into disciplinary lapses still followed the laid down procedures but is now done in a more accelerated fashion. 63. It is clear from the fore-going that, I am enforcing and insisting on a higher standard of performance and conduct from all VRA staff. Clearly the net effect of all of this is perhaps seen by staff as a systematic slaughter of their sacred cows of many years of fattened breeding. Clearly this is almost tantamount to me causing a sacrilege and has certainly blinded them to the more positive benefits that my stewardship has brought to them and the Authority. 2.6.6 MANAGEMENT STYLE: 65. Devolution and Decentralisation (D&D) – Within two months of taking up my appointment, I introduced the management style of D & D into VRA’s operations. Under the D& D, departments are treated as self-managed cost centres, with each Director acting as the Chief executive Officer of their department, and their Deputy Chief Executives acting as the supervising Board members for the Branch. Levels of authority and responsibility which were all embodied in the office of the Chief Executive have been devolved to management, as have activities which hitherto used to be carried out centrally have now been decentralised to the major operating areas. Each Branch Head has also been given the direct managerial and supervisory control of all the management and staff under the various departments under their Branch. 66. The Chief Executive chairs monthly meetings at which reports from the Branch heads are received, discussed and decisions taken on a collective basis. Executive Directors have been equipped with their own departmental financial imprest and given their own departmental cheque books to enable them meet immediate and urgent operational needs of their departments without having to sit and wait for long periods while the centre deals with their needs and delivers them as soon as possible. 67. Contact with Staff – I have introduced a system of twice yearly durbars for all staff in all major operational areas of the Authority. Prior to this, visits by the Chief Executive to operational areas were few and far in-between, and staff durbars were clearly not a regular feature of the management functions of the Authority. 68. In addition to the twice yearly durbars, I have instituted a programme of one-on-one engagement with staff to address their own peculiar welfare and personal issues. To date, I have met more than 200 members of staff on individual basis and all the issues raised by them have subsequently been addressed even though not all have been solved. 69. Forcing the Pace – Deadlines: The norm in VRA in response to timeliness of deliveries has always been to promise to deliver ‘as soon as possible’. Clearly, in the changed circumstances whereby we need to find resources for our operations on a more frequent and regular basis, the laxity inherent in the ‘as soon as possible’ mentality cannot be allowed to continue. I have therefore insisted on instituting and demanding the adherence to deadlines for all major activities carried out for the Authority. I do admit that I do not take kindly to slippages in schedules and make my displeasure known in very strong and forceful terms. 70. Perhaps the way I come across may be sometimes intimidating for those who are not prepared to work for which one must naturally profess an apology, but I do not believe those who I worked closely with are offended by the style. 2.7 SO WHAT NEXT? 72. Unfortunately and despite my expressly stated declaration that, I have gone on political holiday, it has been difficult for people to separate my work of the last two years from the every day politics of the country. This is rather unfortunate as judgement of the merits or otherwise of my tenure as Chief Executive of VRA has more often than not been seen from a political rather than a technical perspective. 73. What I have done in this testament, is to put the basic facts of the issues, the challenges, the actions and the impact of my work over the past 22 months down. I have done so to put the facts before the people of Ghana who have been buffeted so much with the goings on at the VRA. This is my testament, and I put it before the people of Ghana and posterity to inform them and for them to make their own judgement. 74. When I joined the VRA 22 months ago, I made it very clear that I was not in for the long haul. I saw my tenure as short, eventful and lasting for five years at the most. Clearly, I do not believe that the challenge given me has been completely fulfilled. However, I took a decision 15 years ago to return to Ghana to serve and assist our nation’s development. I do not intend to abandon that commitment now or in the future. 75. What happens next is quite properly the prerogative of His Excellency, the President, J. A. Kufuor.
34. The following has been the major steps taken to resuscitate the Authority’s financial problems and return it to a state of financial solvency.
35. When I joined VRA, the average age of the vehicular fleet was about 10 years old. The exception was the fleet of saloon cars for some management staff which was between two to three years old. During my introductory interface with staff at all the major locations in the Authority, the issue of the inadequacy and unreliability of the Authority’s vehicles was brought home forcefully to me. With concern about the handicap that the vehicular problem was posing to the efficient running of the organisation, I accelerated the programme of procurement of new vehicles for the Authority.
44. The following are some of the significant issues that have been addressed in an effort to improve staff welfare and morale to enable them to work more efficiently and productively: i. Staff Promotions & Increments – which had been left outstanding since 1996 were addressed within the first year of my assumption of office. In all more than 800 individual cases were reviewed and action taken on them. In addition, a systematic mechanism has been put in place that ensures that issues of promotion and increment are tackled across the Authority at least every year.
46. Anybody reading the fore-going would wonder why VRA staff would want to see the back of the Chief Executive when indeed they should be patting me on my back. The answer would probably lie in the following chronology of measures that have been put into place to improve the productivity of work in the Authority and to tighten operational control and efficiency.
64. If there is one area of my stewardship at VRA which has come under most discussion, it is the perception that my management style is autocratic and unacceptable. Of course, I did carry a general label of ‘Arrogant’ with me into VRA and that folkloric perception seems to be put out by many people who do not even come into contact with me. I do admit that my work ethic and norms may be fundamentally at odds with the general perspectives of many in society. But I also do believe that straight talk is an important tool in modern management practice as long as there is no abuse or offence caused to colleagues. It is my firm conviction that the reality of the measures that I have put into the VRA do not support the charge of autocracy and arrogance
71. I accepted the call by His Excellency, the President, Mr. J. A. Kufuor to put my professional expertise to use at the VRA. Even though I have dabbled in politics, I considered the challenge as an opportunity to put my expertise and experience to the service of my nation.
I was appointed Chief Executive of the Volta River Authority (VRA) on August 23, 2001, after a brief stint as the Authority’s Chairman. Right from the onset, there was enormous public interest in my association with VRA. The initial interest had more to do with my transition from politician/social advocate to a technocrat serving under President Kufuor’s administration, and what some perceived as my opposition to the NPP during the electioneering process/period. 2. Within a space of four months, the public interest in VRA’s affairs began to focus on the substance of my work with the Authority, especially the relevance and impact of substantial changes that were being introduced into the Authority’s operations. In a sense, the reaction of staff to the changes being made by what they perceived to be an outsider Chief Executive could be understood, even if the substance of the changes themselves was in the right direction. This reaction of the staff to the fundamental changes being made in the Authority was crystallised in the form of a growing spate of unprecedented leakage of official VRA documentation to the public, especially the media and the National Security Agencies.
Ø What actions did I take to address the major problems that I encountered?
Ø What were the benefits and of course, the cost of the measures that I took to address the problems?
Ø What are my hopes and expectations for my future and VRA?
Preamble:
11. I arrived at VRA at the time when the Authority was in the throes of a very deep and challenging period of transition in all of its operations. An Institution whose business has been built on production of power from the Akosombo hydro dam now had to face the reality of a significant and growing injection of thermal power into its operations.
21. The business of VRA is to ensure the reliable and un-interrupted supply of power to facilitate our country’s development. The state of the power system when I started work at VRA was characterised by the following: i . Very low level of the Akosombo Lake; at 246.36ft in August 2001 was about 34 ft. below the maximum operation level. This level was only 4.6ft above the minimum recommended operating level of 240ft.
2.2 FINANCIAL:
22. At the time that I took office, the VRA was technically a bankrupt organisation. The cumulative losses from the years 1997 to 2000 amounted to ¢ 1,430.4 billion and a projected loss for the year 2001 was estimated at ¢ 1,644 billion. i. Many years of low and inadequate tariffs which had exacerbated the Authority’s already worse financial base as the proportion of thermal power increase.
24. Inspite of the fact that VRA operations cover the length and breadth of the country with 41 substations dotted around the country, the level of logistical support that I found when I arrived at the Authority was woefully inadequate, extremely old and very unreliable. The following were the key areas of logistical deficiencies: i. A very old vehicular fleet which had not been renewed for about a decade. Essential maintenance work, especially on the transmission lines, had been reduced to emergency resolution instead of regular preventive work.
2.4 STAFF WELFARE:
25. I encountered a situation where staff morale was extremely low because of the long standing failure to resolve some of the most critical matters of staff welfare.
27. Whilst staff morale was low and could therefore be expected to have a negative impact on productivity and control of the Authority’s resources, I found a situation in the Authority which showed a fundamental weakness in productivity and growing laxity in the application and dedication of many of the staff to their work.
29. When I arrived at VRA, the law was that, every decision was reposed in the person of the Chief Executive. This state of affairs produced a situation of a very remote ‘venerable’ chief executive who oversaw the activities of the Authority largely from the hallowed corridors of the 10th floor of the Authority’s head office.
32. Notwithstanding the low level of the Lake and the engineering problem at the Takoradi Plant, I was firmly of the conviction that VRA needed to ensure that it did absolutely everything to keep the nation’s power system going. It was imperative that existing investors who would make the best ambassadors for this country and other prospective investors in the President’s declared vision of ushering Ghana into the Golden Age of Business should be assured of the availability of ample reliable power for their operations. It was also urgent that domestic consumers who needed to be persuaded to pay economic tariffs for the power that they consumed, should be assured that the power that was being offered to them was reliable, stable and above all continuously available.
33. In the above respect, the following major programmes were put into effect:
i. To repair and restore the generating capacity at the Takoradi Power Company to its full operation in the shortest possible time. This would enable us to generate thermal power cheaper than import from la Cote d’Ivoire and generation from the CMS Plant, and thereby reduce the cost and growing financial debt.
34. The following has been the major steps taken to resuscitate the Authority’s financial problems and return it to a state of financial solvency.
35. When I joined VRA, the average age of the vehicular fleet was about 10 years old. The exception was the fleet of saloon cars for some management staff which was between two to three years old. During my introductory interface with staff at all the major locations in the Authority, the issue of the inadequacy and unreliability of the Authority’s vehicles was brought home forcefully to me. With concern about the handicap that the vehicular problem was posing to the efficient running of the organisation, I accelerated the programme of procurement of new vehicles for the Authority.
44. The following are some of the significant issues that have been addressed in an effort to improve staff welfare and morale to enable them to work more efficiently and productively: i. Staff Promotions & Increments – which had been left outstanding since 1996 were addressed within the first year of my assumption of office. In all more than 800 individual cases were reviewed and action taken on them. In addition, a systematic mechanism has been put in place that ensures that issues of promotion and increment are tackled across the Authority at least every year.
46. Anybody reading the fore-going would wonder why VRA staff would want to see the back of the Chief Executive when indeed they should be patting me on my back. The answer would probably lie in the following chronology of measures that have been put into place to improve the productivity of work in the Authority and to tighten operational control and efficiency.
64. If there is one area of my stewardship at VRA which has come under most discussion, it is the perception that my management style is autocratic and unacceptable. Of course, I did carry a general label of ‘Arrogant’ with me into VRA and that folkloric perception seems to be put out by many people who do not even come into contact with me. I do admit that my work ethic and norms may be fundamentally at odds with the general perspectives of many in society. But I also do believe that straight talk is an important tool in modern management practice as long as there is no abuse or offence caused to colleagues. It is my firm conviction that the reality of the measures that I have put into the VRA do not support the charge of autocracy and arrogance
71. I accepted the call by His Excellency, the President, Mr. J. A. Kufuor to put my professional expertise to use at the VRA. Even though I have dabbled in politics, I considered the challenge as an opportunity to put my expertise and experience to the service of my nation.
