Dr. William Boakye Akoto an ex-NPP MP warns his party and says a difficult post-congress reconciliation awaits the NPP in this free-for-all "I want to be president" contest. History, he asserts, can still repeat itself
Even for the politically uninitiated, the impending flag bearer contest in the ruling New Patriotic Party (NPP) is going to be anything but uneventful. Indeed, signs are emerging to show that the contest can be illustrated with snapshots of a battle between a hungry lioness, who must as well feed her cubs, and a swift gazelle who has the will and the way to survive in the wild.
Against this looming scenario, the party must brace itself in advance to deal with a critical problem of managing a post-congress reconciliation exercise. This issue must be pre-empted because of the posturing of some of the contestants; whose war chests (private banks) combine neatly with their over-rated sense of self-importance.
Some contestants have developed this 'I must win' mental condition and have begun spending so much money in order to gain some advantage over their challengers. With that much money spent to match their self-confidence, inflated egos or self-delusion, we can reasonably anticipate that many of them in the event of losing at the congress could become financially and psychologically deflated. Consequently, they may decide to stay indifferent to the party's affairs or 'proceed on leave' (UGM style). Any of these options could prove counterproductive to a post-congress reconciliation exercise by the party.
Ashantis and Akyems
Another problem we should anticipate implicates the sheer number of serious Akan aspirants. In the event of an Akan candidate winning the contest, and in conformity with the party's tradition, we would have potentially neutralized the opportunity of selecting one of the many prominent but defeated Akans as the running mate of the flag bearer. This issue can deepen the anxiety and disillusionment of over eighty-five (85) percent of the contestants who are Akans, and as a result render difficult any attempt to rein them into the party's campaign efforts in 2008.
Further, we should recognize that most of the 'serious' candidates are aged over sixty-60- years. This means that 2008 may be the last opportunity they could reasonably attempt to be President. For these people, the time is now or never!
Against this background, we can expect that some aspirants would conduct a 'win at all cost' campaign which could invoke some elements that are characteristics of a political Machiavelli.
Already, signs are emerging to show that the taken for granted camaraderie between Ashantis and Akyems is now being put to a test, as exemplified by some recent media publications and the utterances of some politicians and their supporters. Should this throwing of dirt against each other intensify as the campaign moves into a higher gear, the party would find it difficult after the congress to successfully bring all contestants - the victor and the vanquished - on board to prosecute its common agenda in 2008.
It may be true that the NPP has the experience of emerging as a united party after a competitive congress. However, we should also remember that because the party was in opposition when it organized those competitive congresses, not very many people were that eager to spend so much money and flaunt their egos to emerge as the flag bearer. This made post-congress reconciliation efforts relatively easy.
On the contrary, genuine reconciliation after this impending congress may prove illusive. This is because the party is in power and has a huge chance of retaining it, the race to become a presidential candidate has become more attractive to many people who possess the power, ego, and the resources to embolden them enough to stake a claim to the high office of the President. Considering their present state of mind, and the input - time, energy, resources - that these candidates are prepared to commit to their quest for the 'Holy Grail', it is likely that they could become disconsolate should they fail to win at the congress. In that condition, the affected contestants could at best stay indifferent to the party's affairs, or in the worse case scenario become disruptive or a divisive force.
1979
We should not brush aside the unpleasant potential of witnessing a post-congress NPP in disarray in 2008 by going back in time to learn from one past experience of the Danquah-Busia tradition. In 1979, it was largely due to the financial muscle and the ego of the late Gen. A.A. Afrifa and a few others that contributed to splitting the UP tradition into the PFP and the UNC, which in no small measure contributed to the tradition's electoral loss to the late Dr. Hilla Liman's PNP.
The critical ingredients that fed Afrifa's political bravado in 1979 - money and ego - have become a real and present danger to the NPP in 2008, because as we believe, 'history repeats itself'. The NPP must therefore not take the imminent threat of a re-enactment of the 1979 political drama within the Danquah-Busia family for granted. The party must not fold its arms and leave things to chance. The national party executives must not rationalize what is happening on the ground as 'normal' internal party politicking because they are not normal!
Influence of money
I believe the party must immediately take some steps to ensure that the use of money to influence potential delegates by contestants is monitored and appropriate sanctions applied where reasons for the donation of 'gifts' appear flippant or contrived. When I coined the term 'moneycracy' in 2004 to express my anxiety over this creeping exemplification of bribery in its most undignified form, some people thought I was crying wolf, but now, they are beginning to appreciate my fears in retrospect. A few weeks ago, no mean a person as Prof. Frimpong Boateng, an aspirant, sounded the alarm bell about the potential of 'moneycracy' distorting the raison d'être for the election of a flag bearer as part of the processes of national democratic dispensation.
Dirty campaign
Again, for already stated reasons, some contestants could be tempted to wage a dishonest and dirty campaign. This can drive a deep chasm among the contestants depending on who is attacking and who is responding to the attack. The party would therefore need a longer period for a genuine post-congress reconciliation exercise to take place, to assuage built-up ill feelings of contestants. This is why some of us support an early congress. It could be disastrous for the party to go into 2008, after congress in December 2007, and spend any part of that year attempting to reconcile stressed contestants and their supporters.
Fundamentally, I think the party can successfully manage the uneasiness likely to confound a post-congress reconciliation exercise if it can curtail the number of the aspirants. The national executive should make the effort of convincing some of the aspirants to reconsider their decision to contest. Second, the party should put in place a tough vetting process to ensure that contestants who qualify are as 'clean' as possible. This, apart from reducing the number of contestants to the barest minimum, will also eliminate the danger of electing someone who may be concealing from the party a maggot-infested bathroom or a cobwebs-infested closet.
The suggestions above and others that we can come up with need to be seriously considered for strategic planning. Failing, the refrain that the Danquah-Busia tradition is capable of re-uniting after a competitive congress may be told to the Marines this time around.