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IMANI’S Response to Ghana Statistical Service’ Position on the 2010 Census

Sat, 8 Jan 2011 Source: --

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We are responding to comments made on the Joy FM channel by the Public

Relations Officer (PRO) of the Ghana Statistical Service (GSS) on the 6th of

January 2011 seeking to dismiss our legitimate concerns about the

institution’s conduct of the 2010 National Census.

As far as the GSS’ senior staffer was concerned, nothing untoward had

characterised his agency’s management of the census. If a few people hadn’t

been counted, it was because, and we should all know this, people don’t

spend 24 hours in their homes, and it is more than likely that on occasion

enumerators would call on a particular household only to meet the absence of

the members. Indeed, he reckoned, many of the complaints about the census

owe to the work of saboteurs.

We are unimpressed.

Our goal in raising the concerns we did in the media was not to nitpick on

random events that may or may not have happened during the census. Our goal

was to question the overall credibility of the exercise, which we judged to

have departed lamentably from best practice in census management.

We will elaborate. But first let us explain clearly our seeming obsession

with the census.

A national population and housing census is not limited to enumeration (i.e.

head counting). It goes far beyond that. The United Nations Organisation

(UN) has developed a rather rigorous theory about the principles of

“simultaneity, universality and periodicity” in order to guide this crucial

process of collecting vital socio-economic and demographic data for the

purposes of policymaking. The overriding principle is to better understand

trends in the society in order to ensure that decision-making is responsive

to new realities.

All too often, developing countries hold on to the hallowed realities of

yesteryear, failing miserably to adapt to fast-changing situations on the

ground.

For instance, even as the face of poverty becomes increasingly urban,

so-called “poverty alleviation” programs continue to cling to a rural

construct of poverty, thereby not only misdirecting social interventions but

even more sadly missing out on the opportunities offered by urbanisation in

a services-dominated economy.

The absence of good quality data about our evolving circumstances as a

nation interferes so frequently with strategic planning at the

socio-economic and political level that the least civil society

organisations can do is protest when good money is misspent in poorly

executed attempts to redress the situation.

Think about it: this is a country where the official unemployment rate

hovers around 11%; where economic indicators are routinely dismissed as

unreflective of the quality of general welfare; and where “official” job

creation statistics are left to the vagaries of the political rumour mill.

This is a country, where making an objective statement about improvements or

deteriorations in any particular sector is impossible without descending

into the partisan horrors of name-calling.

Think about it.

In some other places, no one has any delusions about the importance of

censuses. Such is the sensitivity that attends censuses in our neighbouring

country of Nigeria that four censuses have been sidelined or annulled (’62,

’63, ’73 and ’91). We may baulk at such indelicate behaviour on the part of

some members of the Nigerian elite in this matter, but we cannot fail to

notice the general point, which is that censuses are, and should be, grave

affairs. Especially in developing countries.

Census data are a placeholder for us in IMANI for objective policy-related

data generally. The lack of such data accounts for the useless squabbles in

our media. It accounts for the “too much heat and no light” nature of our

political conversations. It locks out independent-minded commentators and

make partisan wrangling the reference point for all debate. It prevents

serious comparisons between different managers of our economy and our

society. It makes it impossible to hold public officers to account for the

management of our affairs, except in the case of the most flagrant acts of

corruption. Every comment on performance risks partisan coloration because

hard-hitting observers are unable to take refuge in objective facts and

figures.

Think about it.

So when we spend $50 million or close to that amount to redress some of

these problems, it is just and fair that we insist on getting value for

money.

When the “if you criticise us, you are out for sabotage” Statistical Service

spends $2 dollars thereabouts to administer a questionnaire to each

Ghanaian, we expect that they shall do that and nothing less.

When the “don’t blame us” GSS sets up more than 23,000 so-called enumeration

centers , and hires 45,000 people to undertake a vital national exercise

over a period of 2 weeks, we expect that they will enhance supervision and

coordination. We don’t expect to hear from people living in some of our most

well-laid out neighbourhoods to complain about having been neglected.

At any rate, the basic arithmetic works out to each census staff

administering 38 census forms a day, far from an insurmountable logistical

burden. As it turned out the period was lengthened and the burden per

enumerator thus significantly reduced. So only a lack of supervision and

coordination could have prevented optimal outcomes.

Which is why our concerns with the GSS relate generally to their not having

sufficiently embraced “best practice”.

By establishing a parallel structure rather than integrating into the local

government system (as was the approach in Kenya in 2009, where $2.5 per head

was spent on an identical exercise with near-spectacular results) and then

falling short of supervision and coordination, which decentralisation would

have augmented, GSS was setting itself up for serious challenges.

By failing to conduct rigorous piloting in order to identify hard-to-reach

spots, and thus to develop comprehensive “risk analysis frameworks” for

these specific geographies, GSS was setting itself up for serious

challenges.

By failing to create the framework for external monitoring and evaluation of

the entire process, GSS was missing the opportunity to improve upon its

internal review systems.

By ignoring the opportunity offered by the census process to create GIS and

other mapping systems to give proper meaning to the household survey element

of the overall exercise, GSS was falling short of excellence.

Kenya, which does not even suffer to the same extent from the kind of

chaotic addressing and identification systems we have here, and operating on

a similar per capita budget, made it a point to incorporate essential

elements of this technological approach into their 1999 exercise.

By ignoring the need to develop a credible “non-response follow-up”

mechanism, as the PRO’s comments appear to suggest (he expects people to

randomly call their offices to alert them), the GSS now risks creating a

census register with a margin of error too wide/loose for comfort.

Non-response follow-up mechanisms were clearly not properly advertised, nor

were the avenues made available to the general public convenient enough.

From what we have gleaned, “re-interview procedures” were underemphasised in

the training of enumerators, many of whom were, in the first place,

alienated by the haphazard approach to their remuneration. The labour

resource strategy was thus strained not only by poor hiring practices but

also by payroll management systems. Here is just one more area where the

lack of efficient decentralisation undermined the outcomes of this important

exercise.

Universality, simultaneity and periodicity very simply mean “rigour and

comprehensiveness within a strictly defined timeframe”. The UN

recommendations are quite thorough in this regard, and since a number of

senior staffers in the GSS today have been exposed to the highest levels of

the UN statistical system, we fail to understand their lack of care in these

matters.

All is however not lost.

We are in the post-enumeration survey and review phase, as we understand it.

The GSS can begin to focus on developing robust statistical and data

management techniques to identify lags and laps in the collected data and

start to make amends.

The data analysis and presentation can be approached with seriousness to

take into account ease of retrieval, privacy protections, cross-referencing,

and incorporation into other datasets in Ghana, particular within the local

government system.

We of course shall go ahead with our petition to relevant bodies, but our

hope is that the petition shall be made redundant by a renewed effort on the

part of the GSS to address the concerns many have expressed about the

census, prior to releasing the preliminary report. Furthermore, the GSS

shall have one whole year to make amends before they release the official

report in 2012.

We have never argued that the GSS is staffed by incompetents. What we have

said is that they have not over the period that we and many other

independent commentators have been observing them shown full dedication to

their mandate of supplying credible, quality, data. And that’s a tragedy.

That can change. And, for all our sakes, we hope it will.

*Courtesy of IMANI (www.imanighana.org) & AfricanLiberty.org*

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